it's not a disagreement so much as an (perhaps pointed) observation. a priori matters because it's often used to erroneously present beliefs as truths while eli

it's not a disagreement so much as an (perhaps pointed) observation. a priori matters because it's often used to erroneously present beliefs as truths while eliding critical assumptions, for instance, saying "I am pretty confident [distancing recommendations will] have very little effect on anyone's behavior" without providing any further rationale. it's also erroneous to take objections about that particular restriction as blanket evidence for believing sweden is being heavy-handed overall. that's dichotomous thinking, setting up a false dichotomy and then shoving the opposing position into (what you believe is) the unfavorable corner (for the second time). the point was that that particular restriction was misguided, not its goal of containing the highest likelihood transmission vector, the large private social gathering. the excuse of being easy to understand is exactly how we get bad legislation with numerous unintended consequences that just beg for more (poor) legislation to patch the ever-incresing follow-on consequences, rather than doing the harder work of being as precise and efficacious as possible the first time (and every other time). these are not only erroneous but also ineffective approaches to argumentation. you don't get better rationale, better positions, and better policy from employing such tactics. and yes, we do just disagree on what the best measures are, but that's also the important bit.