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> "...then you are a priori suggesting that we don't, right?" no, because it was based on incorporating the wealth of (imperfect) information that we already h
by clairity 6y ago
> "...then you are a priori suggesting that we don't, right?"
no, because it was based on incorporating the wealth of (imperfect) information that we already have. your statement started with "But we absolutely need restrictions" and then essentially said "not enough data", which makes that statement an a priori presumption. it could be that no restrictions are worth it, but your statement already ruled that out without rationale. mine didn't rule out restrictions, but rather advocated limited and targeted (high bang-for-buck) measures.
as for the rest, a semantic argument over "lockdown" seems unlikely to be fruitful, for an overly-curt phrasing on my part (as in, losing essential nuance for the sake of expedience). i'd generally agree that an indoor social gathering of sufficient density can raise transmission risk, but an arbitrary cutoff is not so useful. 50 people in a house is different from 50 people in a performance hall. incidentally, that's why distancing is a better general rule of thumb, because it concerns density directly (masks, for instance, don't).
and it's not about overreaction but rather precision and efficacy. once you institute a law with stiff penalties, you're raising the spectre of use of force against the populace, which, in a democratic society, should be reserved for the most extraordinary of circumstances, like existentially-threatening insurrections (e.g., civil war, plotting against a governor, etc.), not, relatively-speaking, small parties (or low-risk businesses for that matter). when provided reliable information and not overwhelmed by distortionary narratives, people will generally make reasonable estimations of risk relative to their idiosyncratic risk tolerances, and act accordingly.
all the rest is rhetoric trying to ramp up tensions and fears so that power can be coalesced and exerted. we just don't need to feed that beast in this case (or in most cases, 9/11 being another prominent example).
- jrochkind1 6y agoI think this is the first time i've seen someone say that Sweden's approach involved unnecessary restrictions, but it's an opinion. Maybe lots of people think this I just haven't been talking to them. We agree that "limited and targeted (high bang-for-buck) measures" are called for, I guess we just disagree on what sorts of things they plausibly should be? I'm not sure why you are making this into a disagreement on 'a priori' or whatever. The thing with a 50-person limit is it is easy to understand and easy to comply with. A limit about number of people per cubic meter... the harder it is to know if you are doing it or not, the lower compliance there will be, whether voluntary or with penalties. It makes sense to approximate for comprehensibility -- since it's based on imperfect data in the first place, we certainly don't know the exact risk level of various densities or types of gatherings, only guesses based on imperfect data. (It would be really good to be investing in trying to get better guesses.) It's already an approximation no matter what. That doesn't mean it won't be effective at limiting infection, it is not damned by being an approximation, whether expressed in terms of people per cubic foot or no gatherings over 50 people. Telling people "hey, just a as a rule of thumb you should 'distance', to whatever degree you think appropriate, but it's up to you" will, I am pretty confident, have very little effect on anyone's behavior. At least not in the U.S. Maybe in Sweden.
- clairity 6y agoit's not a disagreement so much as an (perhaps pointed) observation. a priori matters because it's often used to erroneously present beliefs as truths while eliding critical assumptions, for instance, saying "I am pretty confident [distancing recommendations will] have very little effect on anyone's behavior" without providing any further rationale. it's also erroneous to take objections about that particular restriction as blanket evidence for believing sweden is being heavy-handed overall. that's dichotomous thinking, setting up a false dichotomy and then shoving the opposing position into (what you believe is) the unfavorable corner (for the second time). the point was that that particular restriction was misguided, not its goal of containing the highest likelihood transmission vector, the large private social gathering. the excuse of being easy to understand is exactly how we get bad legislation with numerous unintended consequences that just beg for more (poor) legislation to patch the ever-incresing follow-on consequences, rather than doing the harder work of being as precise and efficacious as possible the first time (and every other time). these are not only erroneous but also ineffective approaches to argumentation. you don't get better rationale, better positions, and better policy from employing such tactics. and yes, we do just disagree on what the best measures are, but that's also the important bit.