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> Your response on definitions actually supports my point on the matter I'm afraid I failed to understand your point, then. I don't have a problem with what yo

by qsort 6y ago

> Your response on definitions actually supports my point on the matter I'm afraid I failed to understand your point, then. I don't have a problem with what you said there. > using the word "intelligence" is misleading. I do not, however, think this misuse has any serious consequences This is where I fundamentally differ. Its misuse implies a connection between a formal model (algorithm expressed in a computational model) and a philosophical concept (intelligence) that's dubious at best. On a conceptual level, this makes it harder to reason clearly about those fundamentally mathematical and abstract concepts, and on a concrete level, it misleads the public at large, implying that certain goals have been reached when that's plainly untrue. That's pretty "serious" in my book. > Then that is an unfortunate choice of proxy, unless, perhaps, you intended to imply that it is a priori impossible for intelligence to be created by running x86 machine code. Again, I'm afraid I don't understand your objection. It's widely accepted that all reasonable computational models are equivalent. Citing x86 was colorful language, it has clearly no bearing on the point at large. Machine Learning algorithms are clearly computable, which means they are expressible as Turing machines, terms of a classical untyped lambda calculus, Python scripts, C++ template metaprograms, or anything else. They are literally just programs. > At least since Newton, mathematical models have proved very useful in discerning "truths about the world." Are we to just assume they will not work for the biological phenomena of intelligence and consciousness? I certainly believe mathematical models to be useful, you would be hard pressed to say otherwise. The ontological status of scientific theories is however at the very least a debatable topic. One needs not believe Newtonian mechanics is ontologically true, it's a tenable position to claim it's just a model, and we accept that model because it's useful. Specifically, one could easily argue that Newtonian mechanics is false, because, for example, it fails to accurately predict Mercury's orbit. Similarly, one needs not believe ML is anything more than relatively simple math to find it useful.

mannykannot 6y ago
> I'm afraid I failed to understand your point, then. I don't have a problem with what you said there. You have to go back a couple of posts to see the point. There, you wrote "'Intelligence' is a word that, etymologically and semantically, is related to human or human-like capabilities. You wouldn't say that a leaf floating on a lake is swimming." As we are now agreed that definitions follow from knowledge and are modified in response to new knowledge, it would not be somehow wrong to extend the concept of intelligence to a certain class of machines, if it turns out to be useful and informative to do so. > They are literally just programs. I take it, then, that you don't agree with the sort-of Platonist view that algorithms have an existence independently of any implementation? I'm on the fence, myself, but lean towards the Platonist side. Regardless, it follows from your position here that your original statement "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not x86 machine code" can be rewritten as "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not computable." - but while the former is true, the status of the latter is not yet decided, so they are not identical propositions. > One needs not believe Newtonian mechanics is ontologically true, it's a tenable position to claim it's just a model, and we accept that model because it's useful. One could say the same about specific ontologies - they are as subject to revision in the face of increasing knowledge as are both mathematical models and individual words - and if it turns out that a mathematical model of biological intelligence or consciousness is effective and useful, it would be tendentious to imagine an ontological line between that model and intelligence.
- qsort 6y ago
  > it would not be somehow wrong to extend the concept of intelligence to a certain class of machines, if it turns out to be useful and informative to do so. No objections, but it's a pretty big "if". You could restate my point as "there is no evidence it is in fact useful". > I take it, then, that you don't agree with the sort-of Platonist view that algorithms have an existence independently of any implementation? I'm on the fence, myself, but lean towards the Platonist side. I don't, my position is essentially formalist. While I believe most research mathematicians would side with me here, your position is absolutely valid; famously, Kurt Godel was a Platonist, as are many others. My only observation here is that even from a Platonist point of view you are not really rejecting formalism, at least in the sense that while you don't agree it's the only view, I find it impossible to argue that one can't view mathematical objects as formal constructs. > "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not computable." - but while the former is true, the status of the latter is not yet decided, so they are not identical propositions. No, I don't really hold that view. I probably worded that badly. My position is that the latter is unknown, and I would be content to accept that my brain is not fundamentally different than an algorithm if you showed me an algorithm that can effectively emulate my brain within an acceptable margin of error. Ironically, if it were possible to do that, it would be proof there is no "intelligence", only "computability", making the first entirely redundant. > One could say the same about specific ontologies - Again, this is really thin ice. I don't really know what to think about this because it's getting too abstract for my monkey brain, but it's certainly not obvious that a better model implies an ontological line between itself and reality. To put it bluntly, is a better model really "more true", i.e. qualitatively different from a worse one? I'll take the seventh.
  - magusdei 6y ago
    Can you specify what you mean by "emulate my brain within an acceptable margin of error"? What would this mean as an actual experiment? Depending on your answer, I think we can actually test your implicit proposition that no such algorithm exists.
    - 6y ago

by qsort 6y ago

mannykannot 6y ago

> I'm afraid I failed to understand your point, then. I don't have a problem with what you said there. You have to go back a couple of posts to see the point. There, you wrote "'Intelligence' is a word that, etymologically and semantically, is related to human or human-like capabilities. You wouldn't say that a leaf floating on a lake is swimming." As we are now agreed that definitions follow from knowledge and are modified in response to new knowledge, it would not be somehow wrong to extend the concept of intelligence to a certain class of machines, if it turns out to be useful and informative to do so. > They are literally just programs. I take it, then, that you don't agree with the sort-of Platonist view that algorithms have an existence independently of any implementation? I'm on the fence, myself, but lean towards the Platonist side. Regardless, it follows from your position here that your original statement "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not x86 machine code" can be rewritten as "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not computable." - but while the former is true, the status of the latter is not yet decided, so they are not identical propositions. > One needs not believe Newtonian mechanics is ontologically true, it's a tenable position to claim it's just a model, and we accept that model because it's useful. One could say the same about specific ontologies - they are as subject to revision in the face of increasing knowledge as are both mathematical models and individual words - and if it turns out that a mathematical model of biological intelligence or consciousness is effective and useful, it would be tendentious to imagine an ontological line between that model and intelligence.

qsort 6y ago
> it would not be somehow wrong to extend the concept of intelligence to a certain class of machines, if it turns out to be useful and informative to do so. No objections, but it's a pretty big "if". You could restate my point as "there is no evidence it is in fact useful". > I take it, then, that you don't agree with the sort-of Platonist view that algorithms have an existence independently of any implementation? I'm on the fence, myself, but lean towards the Platonist side. I don't, my position is essentially formalist. While I believe most research mathematicians would side with me here, your position is absolutely valid; famously, Kurt Godel was a Platonist, as are many others. My only observation here is that even from a Platonist point of view you are not really rejecting formalism, at least in the sense that while you don't agree it's the only view, I find it impossible to argue that one can't view mathematical objects as formal constructs. > "What's happening in my brain is something we don't have full scientific knowledge of, but we know it's not computable." - but while the former is true, the status of the latter is not yet decided, so they are not identical propositions. No, I don't really hold that view. I probably worded that badly. My position is that the latter is unknown, and I would be content to accept that my brain is not fundamentally different than an algorithm if you showed me an algorithm that can effectively emulate my brain within an acceptable margin of error. Ironically, if it were possible to do that, it would be proof there is no "intelligence", only "computability", making the first entirely redundant. > One could say the same about specific ontologies - Again, this is really thin ice. I don't really know what to think about this because it's getting too abstract for my monkey brain, but it's certainly not obvious that a better model implies an ontological line between itself and reality. To put it bluntly, is a better model really "more true", i.e. qualitatively different from a worse one? I'll take the seventh.
- magusdei 6y ago
  Can you specify what you mean by "emulate my brain within an acceptable margin of error"? What would this mean as an actual experiment? Depending on your answer, I think we can actually test your implicit proposition that no such algorithm exists.
  - 6y ago