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Anyone know why there's no new URL scheme for HTTP/3? We didn't rely on Alt-Svc headers for switching to HTTPS. We gave it its own scheme. Why aren't we doing t
by jeffbee 6y ago
Anyone know why there's no new URL scheme for HTTP/3? We didn't rely on Alt-Svc headers for switching to HTTPS. We gave it its own scheme. Why aren't we doing that for HTTP/3?
- mercora 6y agonot sure about any details but i would guess its because for HTTPS there are security implications by doing negotiation in the clear whereas this probably doesn't have those.
- floatingatoll 6y agoUsers don’t need to care about the difference between HTTP, HTTP2, and HTTP3. It’s relevant only to browser engineers and server operators. There’s no reason to ask everyone on the planet to change “https:” to “http3:” when we still can’t even reliably complete the “http:” to “https:” transition. We’ve learned that users simply do not care at all about “http:” or “https:”. We shouldn’t have to ask people to update their QR codes for HTTP3 just because we updated the protocol. Should we have introduced ftpp:// for passive FTP to distinguish it from classic FTP? No: it would only confuse users, cause frustration for pages linking to FTP urls, and both servers and clients are perfectly capable of negotiating this silently without surfacing it to the user. In general the pushback with HTTP3 is that site operators would rather not have to do the extra work to enable it. But from a user’s perspective, there is no work to enable it. It’s just https:// https:// like always and one day it gets faster. Sites that refuse to do the extra work to turn it on will be visibly slower than their peers once it’s widespread enough. If you believe that HTTP3 should have had its own URI spec, you would have needed to make that case a few years ago to the committee implementing it; it’s not going to change now. I assume their discussion about that is in the archives, and I expect it boils down to “this is not relevant to users, they should not be expected to care”.
- jeffbee 6y agoBut users don't type or even see the URI scheme any more. It is also an implementation detail. I just think it's weird that we've left ourselves without any way to send a client directly to an HTTP/3 site. Instead they _must_ establish a TCP connection to the site and be redirected via Alt-Svc headers to HTTP/3.
- bastawhiz 6y agoWhat's the backwards compatibility story for that? Links just don't work for older browsers? Why spend all the time making H3 work seamlessly with H2 if we're only going to introduce a new scheme that only works in new HTTP clients?
- vitaliyf 6y agoI am not going to claim myself if this is "right" or "wrong" but there is some work on that being done via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https... - see https://blog.cloudflare.com/speeding-up-https-and-http-3-negotiation-with-dns/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/speeding-up-https-and-http-3-neg...
- floatingatoll 6y agoPreviously, though only 2 comments across 4 posts: https://hn.algolia.com/?q=https%3A%2F%2Fblog.cloudflare.com%2Fspeeding-up-https-and-http-3-negotiation-with-dns%2F https://hn.algolia.com/?q=https%3A%2F%2Fblog.cloudflare.com%...
- ziml77 6y agoThat's not true unless the server is set up to handle redirecting. Every time I go to unifi.home.arpa:8443 I get the message: Bad Request This combination of host and port requires TLS. I have to explicitly type the https:// https:// for it to work.
- floatingatoll 6y agoTo restate my comment in more precise terms, users do not care which protocol of { HTTP/0, HTTP/1, HTTP/2, HTTP/3 } their browser selects and uses when communicating with the remote server at whatever URL they entered. They expect the URL to work, and they don't care how. The Unifi issue you cite is due to a series of problems that are related to the http:// http:// to https:// https:// migration, most of which Unifi could have easily discovered and mitigated had they cared to. I'm really disappointed in Unifi here, but the browser is at fault, too. First: Your browser's fallback process for handling "the user entered an invalid URI" is attempting http:// http:// first, rather than https:// https:// first. Second: The Unifi is responding over http:// http:// with a completely useless error page, rather than a redirect to https:// https:// at the same port. Third: The Unifi probably isn't setting a Strict-Transport-Security header on responses to https://:8443 https://:8443, which means that your browser can't learn a better default. Fourth: If the Unifi's instructions tell you to enter "unifi.home.arpa:8443" rather than "https://unifi.home.arpa:8443 https://unifi.home.arpa:8443", their instructions are clearly wrong. (If you're not following their instructions precisely as written, that would explain your discover of the prior three; I can't say I blame you — I would have left it off too.)
- logicOnly 6y agoOne of my biggest complaints is how https flags text based websites for being dangerous. What danger could possibly happen if I'm reading about a Physical Therapy clinic? They don't take credit cards, there's no information for me to enter on the website. But unless the Physical Therapist knows how to manage the server, they get this scary warning. Maybe it isn't a big deal to US healthcare because they make lots of money. But I imagine there are others that don't have the technical abilities to upgrade to https. Could your grandma do it for her sewing store?
- xahrepap 6y agoThe problem is you can't trust what you're reading to be from the source. Maybe the site doesn't take credit cards. But after a MITM it might suddenly start taking credit cards. And other things. Whatever the attacker wants! All in the seeming name of the origin.
- jk700 6y agoMITM like that still works for most https websites because of the automatic domain validation by ACME-based certificate authorities. The only caveat is that now an attacker has to get a valid certificate, so first he has to do MITM on the route from the datacenters where CAs run validators to the datacenter where the website is hosted, which for most websites today is likely a long route crossing many countries, after that an attacker gets the exact capabilities as with MITMing http.
- suprfsat 6y agoFeb 19, 2020: Multi-Perspective Validation Improves Domain Validation Security (https://letsencrypt.org/2020/02/19/multi-perspective-validation.html https://letsencrypt.org/2020/02/19/multi-perspective-validat...)
- jk700 6y agoThat's the thing, they don't seem to bother actually addressing the problem and assume no other interception capability than hacking BGP. But we are talking here about exactly that, i.e. if you can intercept traffic in any other way somewhere close to a website or its nameservers - you can get a valid certificate and use it to MITM its visitors anywhere in the world where you can intercept traffic too. And in case of using big cloud providers for validation to "improve" security, this still likely pushes traffic from all of them through some big IX before reaching a datacenter with a website and at worst only adds a couple more points an attacker has to intercept traffic at to get the certificate. This is where all that centralization is really bad for security. It basically makes https a protection only against low effort MITM of last mile ISPs.
- hlandau 6y agohttps:// https:// is a scheme, not a protocol. In retrospect, it probably should have been called "www://" and "wwws://" rather than http:// http:// and https:// https://, because a single scheme can potentially be resolved via several different protocols. Consider that http:// http:// does not necessarily imply unencrypted access, due to the opportunistic encryption specification (though this encryption is not MitM-secure). Also note that because http:// http:// and https:// https:// are different schemes, there is no requirement that they serve the same website. http://example.com/foo http://example.com/foo and https://example.com/foo https://example.com/foo could be completely different resources, or completely different websites. An opportunistically encrypted load of an http:// http:// URL still needs to load the http:// http:// website, not the https:// https:// one. Though opting in to HSTS eliminates this distinction. For that matter, HTTP/1.1 allows full URLs to be specified in the request line, as an alternative to the traditional "Host" header. This is usually only used when using HTTP proxies: GET https://example.com/foo HTTP/1.1 ... but what is interesting is since this also includes the scheme, it potentially allows you to do something very peculiar: theoretically you could access an https:// https:// logical resource over an unencrypted HTTP/1.1 connection, e.g. by telnetting to example.com:80 and issuing "GET https://example.com/foo https://example.com/foo HTTP/1.1". It would of course be insane to support this, but if one disregards the fact that https:// https:// is supposed to invariably imply secure communication, theoretically even https:// https:// resources could be loaded unencrypted, just as http:// http:// resources can be loaded encrypted using opportunistic encryption. In short: scheme and protocol are different things, and for good reason. URIs are resource identifiers. They exist to identify a resource, not how to access it. Tying those resource identifiers to a means of resolution would unnecessarily couple it to a resolution mechanism and thereby reduce the universality and permanence of URIs. URIs which are URLs are closer to describing a means of access but fundamentally there's still an interest in providing enough degrees of indirection that the longevity and permanence of an URL is maximised.
- social_quotient 6y agoMakes it sound like https:// https:// is the new USB3
- userbinator 6y ago1.0 and 1.1 didn't have a different URL scheme, why should 3?