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There are several arguments listed at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[0]; namely, the argument from animal suffering, the argument from animal killing,

There are several arguments listed at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[0]; namely, the argument from animal suffering, the argument from animal killing, the argument from environmental damage, and the argument from harm to humans. These are compatible not just with utilitarian moral frameworks, but a variety of metaethical theories. I'm not aware of any theory which has convincingly been able to show that animals are not worthy of moral consideration (but all humans are). Similarly, I'm not aware of any theory which successfully argues that human pleasure from eating meat outweighs the suffering of the animals (without also applying to a variety of human behaviours). Justification like that usually entails that the suffering is necessary, yet moral vegetarianism does make any claim as far as people who need to eat meat (or at least purchase meat or kill animals) for dietary reasons. [0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vegetarianism/#ScheCaseAgaiMeatProd https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vegetarianism/#ScheCaseAg...

sjg007 6y ago
I could see a moral argument in favor of vegetarianism or veganism because it is better for the environment and prevents global warming which in turn is better for humanity and our long term existence. But even then technology may be able to mitigate the impact. For example, feeding ruminants red algae.
javert 6y ago
> I'm not aware of any theory which has convincingly been able to show that animals are not worthy of moral consideration (but all humans are) To argue against eating animals, you need a moral theory which shows that animals are worthy of moral consideration. There is none, that I'm aware of. Not in a strictly rational sense. Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance. (I actually think the "is-ought gap" is an imperfect way to look at it, but that's a simplified way for me to try to explain my objection to these kinds of theories, which may be understandable to people who have at least taken Philosophy 101). Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.
- claudiawerner 6y ago
  >There is none, that I'm aware of. One of the most prominent utilitarians (and ethicists of modern times), Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same. The point of more significant controversy is the strength of that moral consideration, as put by SEP: "That non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen—how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions." >Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance. That's not utilitarianism's job, that's the job of a realist moral epistemology. It is perfectly possible, for instance, to believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism while being a utilitarian. And although I think I side more with the Humean side of the is-ought debate with regard to moral realism, I can also see that moral realists have some good arguments that natural science is not the measure of everything. >Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals. We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration. What we do with that consideration and how it figures into our priorities is only an orthogonal matter. Singer, for instance, in proposing that animals have moral consideration, would not say they have rights, in this case it would be permissible to kill an animal to save the life of a human, whereas it may never be permissible to kill a human to save the life of another human.
  - javert 6y ago
    > Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same. I don't agree with either. In my view, the kinds of arguments they make are not even valid kinds of arguments. > believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism I'm neither of those things, nor do I think they are valid positions. I realize that it's a bit unfair for me to just say that and leave it there, but I can only spend so much time discussing this on HN. > We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration. OK. I wouldn't modify the substance of what I've said even if I accept that. (Though I don't actually agree with this way of separating out the problem space). On the citations of Singer/various Kantians/etc.: It's not my intention to talk past you, it's just that if you say "well, $BIGTEXT has a good argument!", that's not really the kind of thing we can discuss efficiently here. I can make very simple and direct arguments for my views without pointing to some $BIGTEXT. There is nothing wrong with pointing to $BIGTEXT. In fact, somebody might say "Aha! Now I know I need to go read $BIGTEXT." It's just that we can't really "go there" efficiently on HN. It's better if you can make simple and direct arguments, so that people can actually grapple with them. But I know that is not always possible (and this time, I'll grant you, probably isn't, if your views happen to agree with some of the people you've cited).

sjg007 6y ago

I could see a moral argument in favor of vegetarianism or veganism because it is better for the environment and prevents global warming which in turn is better for humanity and our long term existence. But even then technology may be able to mitigate the impact. For example, feeding ruminants red algae.

javert 6y ago

> I'm not aware of any theory which has convincingly been able to show that animals are not worthy of moral consideration (but all humans are) To argue against eating animals, you need a moral theory which shows that animals are worthy of moral consideration. There is none, that I'm aware of. Not in a strictly rational sense. Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance. (I actually think the "is-ought gap" is an imperfect way to look at it, but that's a simplified way for me to try to explain my objection to these kinds of theories, which may be understandable to people who have at least taken Philosophy 101). Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.

claudiawerner 6y ago
>There is none, that I'm aware of. One of the most prominent utilitarians (and ethicists of modern times), Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same. The point of more significant controversy is the strength of that moral consideration, as put by SEP: "That non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen—how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions." >Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance. That's not utilitarianism's job, that's the job of a realist moral epistemology. It is perfectly possible, for instance, to believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism while being a utilitarian. And although I think I side more with the Humean side of the is-ought debate with regard to moral realism, I can also see that moral realists have some good arguments that natural science is not the measure of everything. >Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals. We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration. What we do with that consideration and how it figures into our priorities is only an orthogonal matter. Singer, for instance, in proposing that animals have moral consideration, would not say they have rights, in this case it would be permissible to kill an animal to save the life of a human, whereas it may never be permissible to kill a human to save the life of another human.
- javert 6y ago
  > Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same. I don't agree with either. In my view, the kinds of arguments they make are not even valid kinds of arguments. > believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism I'm neither of those things, nor do I think they are valid positions. I realize that it's a bit unfair for me to just say that and leave it there, but I can only spend so much time discussing this on HN. > We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration. OK. I wouldn't modify the substance of what I've said even if I accept that. (Though I don't actually agree with this way of separating out the problem space). On the citations of Singer/various Kantians/etc.: It's not my intention to talk past you, it's just that if you say "well, $BIGTEXT has a good argument!", that's not really the kind of thing we can discuss efficiently here. I can make very simple and direct arguments for my views without pointing to some $BIGTEXT. There is nothing wrong with pointing to $BIGTEXT. In fact, somebody might say "Aha! Now I know I need to go read $BIGTEXT." It's just that we can't really "go there" efficiently on HN. It's better if you can make simple and direct arguments, so that people can actually grapple with them. But I know that is not always possible (and this time, I'll grant you, probably isn't, if your views happen to agree with some of the people you've cited).