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>All ethics ultimately stem from what people feel is or isn't right. All ethical considerations are processed in our brains. This is debatable. Some metaethici

>All ethics ultimately stem from what people feel is or isn't right. All ethical considerations are processed in our brains. This is debatable. Some metaethicists would argue that the ethical realm is much like the mathematical one, and less of a matter of the functioning of the human brain. Further, it seems to me there is a difference between saying "I don't like X" and saying "X is morally wrong" - if there is a difference between those two statements (as a moral cognitivist would claim), then deduction of morals from "what feels right" is suspect. The argument of cognitivism vs non-cognitivism is interesting[0]. >There are some basic ethical concepts on which human societies tend to universally agree on. The number and reach of those principles is very debatable. Arguments from moral disagreement cast doubt on the extent to which human societies share ethical standards. >humans living in roughly the same social structures I don't think that's true at all; post-globalization, there has been a convergence in what social structures look like around the world, but it's very clear that humans have had and in many cases still do have a variety of social structures, and with that, a variety of obligations. The moral obligation to do X in Japan, for instance, may be different by virtue of a different social structure. Using neuroscience to "deduce" ethics seems like the ultimate briding of the is-ought gap and I'm not aware of any professional philosopher or theory who has successfully argued that this is possible. The attempt in Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape has been shot down from practically every angle imaginable, and I think for good reason. [0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

TeMPOraL 6y ago
I'll read up on the philosophy. But fundamentally, if not from the brain, then where else would morality originate from? God? But then if you look at every religion that claims it speaks for God, you'll find something in the proposed moral standards you'll disagree with on moral grounds. "Structure of the universe"? That's meaningless unless you point out what aspect of that structure determines morality, and I'm willing to bet it'll turn out that that aspect can be fully captured in the workings of the brain. What else is there to ground on? As far as I know, all moral questions under all moral philosophies, no matter how convoluted, are ultimately verified by testing the conclusions against examples simple enough that you can get a gut-feeling answer for them. Every criticism of a moral philosophy I've ever seen boils down to finding an example where applying some high-level rule leads to conclusions that cannot be reconciled with the gut.
- claudiawerner 6y ago
  It is indeed a problem to justify the source of morality as anywhere other than the subjective perception of the brain. However, I think most people would agree that a rational action or chain of reasoning is rational regardless of the brain, or to what ends. Similarly, most would agree that humans are susceptible to various non-rational behaviours. I'm not here to argue for an objective morality, or the various arguments put forward for moral realism (since I'm not a moral realist myself). Also, the role of intuition in morality (and knowledge in general) is contested. I think that to commit to a system in which we only formalize our intuitions falls victim to three kinds of objection: those who have a reasonable case that we haven't caputered the intuitions correctly, those who doubt the role of intuition in moral decision making (several popular theories, from Kant's to Bentham's result in non-intuitive results in which their proponents will bite the bullet), and those who argue either that moral facts cannot be truthy, or that they can be truthy (but we always get them wrong), or they can be truthy (but we have no way of knowing which are true and which are false).

TeMPOraL 6y ago

I'll read up on the philosophy. But fundamentally, if not from the brain, then where else would morality originate from? God? But then if you look at every religion that claims it speaks for God, you'll find something in the proposed moral standards you'll disagree with on moral grounds. "Structure of the universe"? That's meaningless unless you point out what aspect of that structure determines morality, and I'm willing to bet it'll turn out that that aspect can be fully captured in the workings of the brain. What else is there to ground on? As far as I know, all moral questions under all moral philosophies, no matter how convoluted, are ultimately verified by testing the conclusions against examples simple enough that you can get a gut-feeling answer for them. Every criticism of a moral philosophy I've ever seen boils down to finding an example where applying some high-level rule leads to conclusions that cannot be reconciled with the gut.

claudiawerner 6y ago
It is indeed a problem to justify the source of morality as anywhere other than the subjective perception of the brain. However, I think most people would agree that a rational action or chain of reasoning is rational regardless of the brain, or to what ends. Similarly, most would agree that humans are susceptible to various non-rational behaviours. I'm not here to argue for an objective morality, or the various arguments put forward for moral realism (since I'm not a moral realist myself). Also, the role of intuition in morality (and knowledge in general) is contested. I think that to commit to a system in which we only formalize our intuitions falls victim to three kinds of objection: those who have a reasonable case that we haven't caputered the intuitions correctly, those who doubt the role of intuition in moral decision making (several popular theories, from Kant's to Bentham's result in non-intuitive results in which their proponents will bite the bullet), and those who argue either that moral facts cannot be truthy, or that they can be truthy (but we always get them wrong), or they can be truthy (but we have no way of knowing which are true and which are false).