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Dropbox Lack of Security
- zdw 16y agoCouple this with the unencrypted metadata on mobile problem: https://grepular.com/Dropbox_Mobile_Less_Secure_Than_Dropbox_Desktop https://grepular.com/Dropbox_Mobile_Less_Secure_Than_Dropbox... And how their "encryption" on the server side is basically a lie, as they do dedupe on data: http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/04/how-dropbox-sacrifices-user-privacy-for.html http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/04/how-dropbox-sacrifices-u... I'm stunned that anyone would use them for anything for ephemeral data you wouldn't mind posting in public.
- arashf 16y agohi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. I'm not sure why you're concluding that de-duplication implies lack of encryption. the de-duplication occurs prior to encryption. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage servers anymore. for very sensitive data, there's always the option to use truecrypt (we even offer this as a recommendation in our security documentation: https://www.dropbox.com/terms#security https://www.dropbox.com/terms#security)
- pgbovine 16y agoesteemed mr. arash, perhaps it might be a good idea for someone within dropbox to write a blog post answering common security-related concerns. having a security sub-section in TOS is great, but it might be buried in google searches. anyways, it seems like this is a common concern amongst bloggers as you guys are exponentially rising in popularity, so some good PR on that front might be needed. as usual, we're all rooting for you :)
- zdw 16y agoDedupe and cleartext metadata as stated in the article I referenced, would allow for the following possibilities: If an attacker could figure out the hash method used by dropbox on the files and intercept a few hashes from a victim, it's plausible that an attacker could trick the service into thinking that he had uploaded the files on his own account, allowing access to the victim's files. Could you explain what would need to be done to protect against this attack method? Security is hard - I hope yours improves.
- arashf 16y agocryptographic signatures of files are never transmitted over plaintext. yes, the current incarnation of the mobile apps don't encrypt the names of the files but we are working on a fix for this as soon as we can adequately improve the SSL performance of our mobile apps.
- steve19 16y agoI love your product but your encryption is pretty useless and y'all must know it. It only protects my data if your S3 account is compromised. There is a much greater chance that your web frontend, servers or client are compromised (either by an external or internal attacker) and then my files are easily accessed and decrypted. It is like naive programmers who store user passwords with 'government level encryption' instead of correctly salting and hashing them, thus having to put encryption key in the source code select AES_ENCRYPT("user password", "our secret key"); Saying your CEO can't access it, is just more security theater.
- joanou 16y agoDropbox is a good service, and I am sure file access is limited to a few employees, but I wouldn't use it for sensitive data or for a business. Any service where you do not control the encryption keys, e.g. Box.net, and myriad others will have the same issue. It's all about tradeoffs. Ultimately they can access your data. The truecrypt option may solve it for some but that means the whole archive has to be shared. AltDrive unlimited online backup versions your files and allows you to control your encryption key. It runs on *nix, OSX, Windows, and other OSs. http://altdrive.com http://altdrive.com
- tzs 16y agoIt is possible to design a Dropbox-like system with the following properties: 1. Files are stored encrypted. 2. The service provider does not have the ability to arbitrarily decrypt the files. By "arbitrarily decrypt" I mean decrypt at any time they wish. They will be able to decrypt if the owner's client is actively connected. 3. When someone uploads a file that is identical to an existing file, it initially is stored separately, but in most cases can be eventually de-duplicated, without compromising #1 or #2. I'll leave the details as a fun exercise.
- rw 16y agotarsnap
- tlrobinson 16y agoI'm guessing tarsnap doesn't satisfy the 3rd criteria, nor is tarsnap able to decrypt the user's files, even when the client is connected. Perhaps cperciva can comment.
- theFco 16y ago3rd criteria can be considered a vulnerability, it may allow to know that certain user has a known file. It can be exploited to reveal information about the encrypted files.
- tlrobinson 16y agoYes, I read that article too. That information leakage vulnerability can be eliminated by requiring the user always upload the file the first time they store it. Subsequent uploads of the same file for the same user could be skipped. De-duplication across users in storage is also possible without leaking information. What is not possible (AFAIK) is the combination of the two requirements: 1) de-duplication across users, and 2) service provider is not able to decrypt your files. The latter requires the encryption/decryption be done on the client only (service provider doesn't have the keys at all). The former requires access to the unencrypted file, or for the clients to share keys.
- earl 16y agotruecrypt ftw If you're uncomfortable with dropbox, put a truecrypt partition right inside your dropbox folder.
- tectonic 16y agoI've been doing this for a while now and it works quite well.
- bdhe 16y agoIn theory, if multiple snapshots of truecrypt are maintained, I believe it must be secure, but did the designers of truecrypt keep that in mind? Does dropbox maintain periodic snapshots of uploaded files?
- Maxious 16y agoUnlimited versions within last 30 days for all free and paid users (including changesets where files are deleted), paid users can also pay extra to keep every version since file creation. So if you were suspected of getting a secret file and placing it in a dropbox hosted truecrypt volume, there would be a record of the time/date of altering the truecrypt volume and the possibility to compare the differences between two versions.
- revorad 16y agoHow does that work with shared folders?
- brown9-2 16y agoIf you do this, make sure you disable the TrueCrypt option which preserves the original modification time of the encrypted volume when you modify the container, otherwise Dropbox may not notice when you make changes. The "preserve modification timestamp" option is part of TC's plausible deniability feature.
- arashf 16y agohi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage servers anymore. for very sensitive data, there's always the option to use truecrypt (we even offer this as a recommendation in our security documentation: https://www.dropbox.com/terms#security https://www.dropbox.com/terms#security)
- AndyNemmity 16y agoWhat about allowing government access to files? Do you require a warrant? Under what circumstances?
- arashf 16y agowe take as firm as stance as possible on user privacy (google faces and fights these very issues) the government needs to comply with the provisions of the electronic communications privacy act by obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause (or in some cases a court order from a judge). these safeguards protect user privacy, even when the government is involved.
- bradgessler 16y agoAssuming you store files as a combination of a hash digest function as a key and file data as a value; what controls do you have in place to handle situations where law enforcement discovers some sort of 'illegal' file data on one users account subsequently requests details on users with hash digests that match the data in that file?
- arashf 16y agode-duplication doesn't make users any more vulnerable to intrusive government actions. today, a government agency could ask any online service to provide the names of all users who have a particular file, whether or not the service employs de-duplication. and in that case, the government would also need to support its request with a warrant or court order. the rules that provide a check against unwarranted government snooping apply to online services equally, regardless of their backend architecture.
- thought_alarm 16y agoDo a lot of people think that Dropbox is some sort of super-private service? I'm no security expert, but do I hope it's obvious to most people that Dropbox wouldn't be able to do stuff like reset your password if they didn't have access to the contents of your files at some level. A truly secure and private service would look a lot different, and be much more complicated to set up. That's the tradeoff.
- bxr 16y ago>I hope it's obvious to most people that Dropbox wouldn't be able to do stuff like reset your password if they didn't have access to the contents of your files at some level Those are pretty damn high hopes even for the average user from the generation that grew up with computers.
- chrishenn 16y agoRelying on others to safeguard/encrypt your personal data just doesn't make sense to me, in the same way that closed-source cryptography doesn't make sense. If dropbox is claiming a false sense of security then that is an issue, but users that truly care about their data should resort to truecrypt or something where they are the only ones who control access. You can sync your files with dropbox and keep them safe with a truecrypt volume. Or if that is to much of a pain, only do so for sensitive files. Have your cake and eat it too!
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]
- tlrobinson 16y agoIt always seemed obvious to me that Dropbox has access to your unencrypted files because they make them available to you through the web interface.
- bdhe 16y ago> because they make them available to you through the web interface. You could have client side javascript that decrypts the files. http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/ http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/
- tlrobinson 16y agoAnd where would the decryption keys come from?
- bdhe 16y agoYou generate the key from your username and password and/or store it locally?
- tlrobinson 16y agofunction decrypt(cipertext, key) { var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.open("POST", "/retrieve_user_key?key="+key); req.send(); // decryption routines return result; } Do you trust Dropbox to not send compromised JavaScript every time? If so, why not trust them with your keys in the first place? Of course you also need to trust the desktop Dropbox client. The only (approximately) truly secure way to do this is with an open source client you can inspect and compile yourself (i.e. tarsnap).
- bdhe 16y ago> Do you trust Dropbox to not send compromised JavaScript every time? If so, why not trust them with your keys in the first place? I was thinking about the subpoena situation, when the Govt. demands Dropbox to hand over keys. I presume DropBox can definitely send compromised JS or even a malicious client. This is very reminiscent of the whole notion of trusting trust! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)#Reflections_on_Trusting_Trust http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)#Reflection...
- MetallicCloud 16y agoWouldn't they have to keep the keys on their servers? Otherwise when my computer dies, I wouldn't be able to access my files from a different computer.
- jeffreyg 16y agoThere was a really good thread in /r/netsec a few days ago about encrypting your dropbox: http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/gowvu/doityourself_encrypted_dropbox_any_ideas/ http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/gowvu/doityourself_e...
- icedpulleys 16y agoRegardless of how you want to parse a company's public statements and written policies, it's the height of naivete to think that a data host (ANY host) wouldn't share your data with law enforcement or has encrypted data in such a way that they guarantee that no one can access it. If you have sensitive data, encrypt it yourself. Encrypt it on your local drive, back up encrypted data, encrypt it before uploading it to Dropbox. Doing otherwise is akin to not having a proper backup process: it's either because of laziness or ignorance.
- patio11 16y agoThis is the first time I've heard someone on HN actually ask for more security theatre. Sure, Dropbox could spend seven figures to get a ISOxxxx whatever consultancy to draw up a 125 page document describing their internal checks, do the obligatory all-hands yearly mandatory training where you have to get 10/10 questions right and question 1 is "A user has uploaded naked pictures of themselves to their account. True or false: it is permissible to download these and take them home with you.", etc etc. And they'd be exactly where we are today: 1) Yes, we could look at your data any time we want to. This is an inevitable consequence of letting you look at your data any time you want to. 2) We promise not to abuse our power #1. 3) If you don't trust us on #2, you should not do business with us. Except they'd be out seven figures.
- shin_lao 16y agoI might have misunderstood what you meant, but #1 is invalid. If I can look at my data any time I want, I just need the key to it. Dropbox just gives me access to the encrypted stream. Giving access to my data to someone else would therefore just be a question of sharing the key with that person, again, without Dropbox ever having access to this key. Your killer argument is to me #3. If you don't trust a company, don't do business with it. It all comes down to this.
- kwis 16y agoTarsnap provides exactly the sort of service you're referring to, where they only store encrypted data and don't have a copy of the key. I'm a big fan of that architecture, if only because it greatly reduces the payoff of a successful attack. When everything is stored unencrypted (or with a common master key), there's an absolutely massive payoff for the hacker who breaches the security.
- shin_lao 16y agoTarsnap is great and its author knows what he's doing but dropbox is many UA ahead in terms of useability and platform interoperability. Dropbox is incredibly easy to use, that's where its power comes from. It's "secure enough" for casual use. Additionally I believe you can't share data between users with tarsnap. There is a market opportunity for a corporate-level secure data exchange infrastructure.
- kennywinker 16y agoforgive me if I'm naive, but can file hashes be spoofed in any way? I'm thinking upload a bunch of files that hash to random numbers, then download the de-duplicated original files. could someone more knowledgable in this area tell me if this is a credible threat?
- kennywinker 16y agoand is the hashing done by the client, or server-side? because client-side would make spoofing even easier.
- steve19 16y agoClient side. If you upload a very popular 500+mb file, maybe try a popular linux distribution iso, it will sync instantly.
- taken11 16y agoso has someone written a client where you just enter hashes of popular files you are interested in and get them snyced to your dropbox?
- wladimir 16y agoAs far as I know, not yet. It's not even publicly known how exactly the deduplication API works. For example: is the hash enough to "prove" you have a file? Or do you need the file size (and potentially other properties, such as the first block) as well? The only way to find this out would be to look at the protocol that the proprietary client uses.
- bluelu 16y ago10 years ago, europeonline launched a service where your traffic downlink would be routed through a satelite connection. They also had a service that let you predownload files from http/ftp servers and then you could request an offline broadcast from their servers to your home pc. Instead of refetching every file again and again, they also optimized by only checking the file size + file name. So, someone came along and created a fake ftp server script, which just replied with a listing of the things you wanted to download, and they there instantly added to your account. You only had to know the filename + filesize.
- donpark 16y agoThree points: 1. Sensationalism aside, Dropbox should review questionable security claims to reduce false sense of security if any. With millions of users, careless words formed out of marketing needs are no longer needed. What Dropbox users need now is more clear picture of what they are giving up to gain Dropbox's services. 2. The weakest security link is the user and their computer, not Dropbox which has enough financial incentives at stake to be diligent security wise. In the end, no computer open to external data or code is safe. What protect most users today is actually not security technologies but cost/benefit ratio to potential attackers, tempered by goal and scale. 99.9999% of Dropbox user data is useless to attackers and cost of mining questionable nuggets out continually expanding sea of data from 20 million users is not a trivial task. 3. While it's true that user must trust Dropbox in the end, some of its security measures could use strengthening even if it's just intended to raise the level of sophistication necessary to steal Dropbox data.
- latch 16y agoAgreed. Except a lot of companies have a lot of " financial incentives at stake to be diligent security wise" but aren't. Something I very recently heard: "World of Warcraft has had RSA-style two-factor token authentication for years, and my bank still doesn't"
- donpark 16y agoSome thoughts re WoW vs banks: WoW Authenticator is optional, costs $30~40, and intended for serious WoW players in a community with very strong peer support. Banks can do first two but don't have a community of tech savvy users to reduce cost of support manageable. So Blizzard could but banks couldn't. Will this change? I think so but it'll have to be opt-in and paid for by customers, likely through third-party services first.
- TillE 16y agoEvery bank in Germany (that I know of) uses TAN lists. They mail you a list of generated numbers, and for each transaction, you need to enter one of those numbers, which is then consumed. No fancy gadgetry required. Just a sheet of paper gives you all the same security advantages.
- gergles 16y agoI don't care. I use Dropbox because of the unparalleled feature set and ease of integration. I have my taxes stored on Dropbox, along with a lot of other sensitive information. They're in an encrypted RAR file with a line-noise passphrase, just like they would be if I were storing them anywhere (including locally -- after all, what if Mallory steals your hard drive? Or, to parrot the most common movie plot threat, what if the NSA secretly breaks into your house when you're out at the movies and images all your disks then slips them back in without your knowledge?) The features DB offers for sharing, web access, etc. are well worth the tradeoff, and I am ashamed to see the security pedants constantly pillorying Dropbox because it's not some imaginary "verified secure" system. They don't advertise to be that. A claim of "we encrypt your files with RSA" should be utterly meaningless to you without knowledge of how the key is controlled, and a few seconds' thought and examination of the feature set should inform you that yes, Dropbox has to have the key to decrypt the files. That doesn't make the claim of "your files are encrypted" any less true.
- JonnieCache 16y agoYou should consider using something like truecrypt rather than rar encryption. http://www.truecrypt.org/ http://www.truecrypt.org/
- lean 16y ago> paying Dropbox customer here, I wouldn't call the features "unparalleled". SugarSync offers more, and for slightly less: https://www.sugarsync.com/sync_comparison.html https://www.sugarsync.com/sync_comparison.html ...or so I'm assuming. I never tried it because last time I checked they require a credit card for a free trial.
- heyitsnick 16y agoSeems like you can get a free 5g account without CC here: https://www.sugarsync.com/signup?startsub=5 https://www.sugarsync.com/signup?startsub=5
- perlgeek 16y agoI don't know if that's how dropbox does it, but I could imagine that they have a master key to which normal employees don't have access, you need the founder and a trusted second person to retrieve it. Thus their statement "Dropbox employees aren't able to access user files, and when troubleshooting an account" wouldn't be too far off the mark, and they can still make the data available to the government, on request and with higher effort.
- ahmad598_ 16y agostallman was right, we should never trust cloud. put all your eggs in a basket and keep it tight with yourself, don't throw it to the clouds.
- csallen 16y agoDropbox didn't lie. This is simply a misinterpretation (or misunderstanding) of what's meant by the phrase "Dropbox employees aren't able to access user files". It's not the same as saying "It's impossible." The fact is, if you send a company your unencrypted data, it's obviously possible for them to view it at some point. Otherwise they could never encrypt it in the first place. So when they say that employees aren't able to access it, they mean that they, as a company, choose not to access it. A good analogy is the post office. Anyone who works there and handles your mail could, if they so desired, tear open your package and steal the cookies your mother sent you. We trust them anyway, because we know they take precautions to ensure it doesn't happen. Dropbox is the same, but even tougher (I doubt the average Dropbox employee has access to their decryption mechanisms, but plenty of people at the post office can unseal your envelopes). That said, to not acknowledge it as even possible for the company you send your data to you be able to access that data seems, to me, a bit naive. That's not the promise they made, and so the claim that they lied is false.
- loumf 16y agoThe plain English meaning of the words "aren't able to access user files" is not the same as "choose not to access user files". Dropbox could just keep keys in a store where only automated user accounts can get to them -- ones where only the founders have passwords, or they are in escrow. I think there are ways to restrict the access to founders and a fail-safe, without opening them up to anyone who works at Dropbox.
- acdha 16y agoIf you run their client you've already made the decision to trust them to behave responsibly. The rest of this discussion is simply about obfuscation.
- bxr 16y ago>We trust them anyway Much of that trust is based on the fact it is a felony, not what could just be an internal slap on the wrist.
- bajsejohannes 16y ago
- davidmduarte 16y agoI don't use Dropbox because their app on my computer have access to my computer. The data I could send to Dropbox are as secure as the data i send to a host or email server. ... or may I wrong. :)
- drdaeman 16y agoYou can sandbox it.
- jbverschoor 16y agoIf I steal your ssh private key, I can do anything I want
- grandalf 16y agoAll US companies will comply with government requests for data, even Google, when a warrant is presented. If you don't want anyone looking at your data, use your own strong encryption layer and hope that there's not a back door.
- runjake 16y agoAll this press about Dropbox is getting ridiculous. I'm almost suspecting it's a hit job, but I'm wondering why people like De Caza are getting involved. Pay attention to the two following rules. They are, and always have been true. Write them down if need be: 1.) The government can demand files from any US (and many non-US) companies. The company is then legally-obligated to turn them over. In the past, the government has even successfully demanded data without the proper warrants (read about the VZW/AT&T/Qwest/NSA fiascos). 2.) Your cloud data is always subject to security breaches and provider employee abuse. Encrypt accordingly (I prefer DMG and TrueCrypt). Why is this news? Did people not understand this?
- kevinpet 16y agoThis is the second completely unreasonable press attack on Dropbox. They are so unreasonable that I have trouble believing a reasonable person would think they are valid complaints unless they were trying to sell me a competing product. Everyone with any security sense knows: 1. If someone gains access to your computer, and they can read your hard drive, and your computer can automatically log in to some service, then they can log in to that service. 2. If you can access the data without decrypting it locally, then your service provider can too. In a fantastically secure system, they will have decide to do and then wait for you to log in, but that's pretty unusual. I predict next week we will get an article pointing out that I can get your files by breaking into your email account and then using the reset password feature.