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Note that Eastman Kodak is viewed in legal circles as the exception to the general rule of disallowing single-brand relevant markets, due to the particular circ
by nodamage 6y ago
Note that Eastman Kodak is viewed in legal circles as the exception to the general rule of disallowing single-brand relevant markets, due to the particular circumstances of the case.
In Kodak, customers originally purchased Kodak copiers without any restrictions, and then several years later Kodak changed their policy and stopped selling repair parts to third-party servicers, which left customers locked into buying repair services from Kodak instead.
In Newcal, IKON amended their lease agreements with their customers without disclosing to the customers that the length of their service contracts would be extended as well, similarly leaving customers locked into buying services from IKON.
In both of those cases, there was an element of deception, and customers did not know that they would be restricted in the aftermarket when they made their original purchase. It's tough to argue that those circumstances apply here, since Apple's policies have been clear since the launch of the App Store and have never changed. In fact, some courts have interpreted Kodak to mean that absent a change in policy, Kodak does not apply.
Note that the paragraph you quoted specifically says: "the law permits an inquiry into whether a consumer's selection of a particular brand in the competitive market is the functional equivalent of a contractual commitment, giving that brand an agreed-upon right to monopolize its consumers in an aftermarket." I expect Apple will be able to successfully convince the court that this is indeed the case.
- gpm 6y agoIf I was epic I think I would be focusing on the fact that consumers generally don't have any idea about the restriction on payment providers, and that the terms of that restriction have changed over time. But that gives up on half the case, so we'll see what they do.
- nodamage 6y agoThat's true, but for Epic's tying claim they've argued that the tying product is iOS app distribution and the tied product is payment processing, which again relies on establishing that iOS app distribution is in fact a valid antitrust market. If that fails, they might be able to amend their claim to argue that iPhones are the tying product, but then that opens up a different set of questions about how much market power Apple has in the overall smartphone market. (They also need to establish that payment processing is actually a distinct product or service from app distribution, which is not necessarily obviously true and depends on a separate set of factors.)