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Having a tipline isn't so bad on its own, but then the problem becomes: User leaves unverifiable tip, what do you do with it? It's not like you can break the en

Having a tipline isn't so bad on its own, but then the problem becomes: User leaves unverifiable tip, what do you do with it? It's not like you can break the encryption...

deathgrips 6y ago
Turn it over to law enforcement. A single chat message is rarely a crime, but can be used to find further evidence of crime.
- some_furry 6y ago
  Turn what over to law enforcement? The ciphertext and timestamp?
  - deathgrips 6y ago
    A statement from the user who submitted it, including their unverifiable copy of the offensive message. The law is not computer code. They don't need to break ciphertext to get a warrant.
    - some_furry 6y ago
      You can do this thing called "message franking" to make it more verifiable, if you want. The downside is, context matters. If you report messages out-of-order or with important context deleted, you can trick investigators into thinking something was said or implied that actually wasn't. It needs to be carefully designed. (I blog about cryptography, but you should ask a cryptographer if you want to design something like this.)
      - deathgrips 6y ago
        I don't design message apps. I just know that law enforcement did just fine before the internet when most communication (face to face, over the phone) wasn't recorded or verifiable.
  - Spivak 6y ago
    If we’re talking about content that you literally don’t have access to and can’t see because it’s encrypted, like iMessage or Signal then you don’t need Section 230 protection because you aren’t moderating content.
x86_64Ubuntu 6y ago
Sounds like we are turning our entire website infrastructure into a 1984 monitoring system
- webmaven 6y ago
  > Sounds like we are turning our entire website infrastructure into a 1984 monitoring system It already is one for all intents purposes, just not one that is used ubiquitously (except in the sense of getting us to buy stuff). All that is changing is that the panopticon is becoming slightly more explicit than implicit, making it that much easier to (eventually) flip a policy switch that designates groups wholesale as "enemies of the people" requiring active scrutiny and interference. I'm reminded of this cartoon: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-x2BP9Xd7xfo/T7bvuweLPfI/AAAAAAAACjQ/SPcXLcudnIY/s1600/Internet+Wrapped.jpg http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-x2BP9Xd7xfo/T7bvuweLPfI/AAAAAAAACj... Twenty years later and it is still fresh as a daisy.
- 082349872349872 6y ago
  Ingsoc didn't monitor proles, and didn't always monitor inner party members, so I'd claim its monitoring reach was only somewhere between half and a quarter of our entire website infrastructure. Bonus clip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQ6LGrr8iEg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQ6LGrr8iEg

Having a tipline isn't so bad on its own, but then the problem becomes: User leaves unverifiable tip, what do you do with it? It's not like you can break the encryption...

deathgrips 6y ago

Turn it over to law enforcement. A single chat message is rarely a crime, but can be used to find further evidence of crime.

some_furry 6y ago
Turn what over to law enforcement? The ciphertext and timestamp?
- deathgrips 6y ago
  A statement from the user who submitted it, including their unverifiable copy of the offensive message. The law is not computer code. They don't need to break ciphertext to get a warrant.
  - some_furry 6y ago
    You can do this thing called "message franking" to make it more verifiable, if you want. The downside is, context matters. If you report messages out-of-order or with important context deleted, you can trick investigators into thinking something was said or implied that actually wasn't. It needs to be carefully designed. (I blog about cryptography, but you should ask a cryptographer if you want to design something like this.)
    - deathgrips 6y ago
      I don't design message apps. I just know that law enforcement did just fine before the internet when most communication (face to face, over the phone) wasn't recorded or verifiable.
- Spivak 6y ago
  If we’re talking about content that you literally don’t have access to and can’t see because it’s encrypted, like iMessage or Signal then you don’t need Section 230 protection because you aren’t moderating content.

x86_64Ubuntu 6y ago

Sounds like we are turning our entire website infrastructure into a 1984 monitoring system

webmaven 6y ago
> Sounds like we are turning our entire website infrastructure into a 1984 monitoring system It already is one for all intents purposes, just not one that is used ubiquitously (except in the sense of getting us to buy stuff). All that is changing is that the panopticon is becoming slightly more explicit than implicit, making it that much easier to (eventually) flip a policy switch that designates groups wholesale as "enemies of the people" requiring active scrutiny and interference. I'm reminded of this cartoon: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-x2BP9Xd7xfo/T7bvuweLPfI/AAAAAAAACjQ/SPcXLcudnIY/s1600/Internet+Wrapped.jpg http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-x2BP9Xd7xfo/T7bvuweLPfI/AAAAAAAACj... Twenty years later and it is still fresh as a daisy.
082349872349872 6y ago
Ingsoc didn't monitor proles, and didn't always monitor inner party members, so I'd claim its monitoring reach was only somewhere between half and a quarter of our entire website infrastructure. Bonus clip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQ6LGrr8iEg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQ6LGrr8iEg