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The circumstances under which the MCAS system are precisely described. Are you disputing that those circumstances are unusual in commercial flights?

linuxftw 6y ago
There's no need to speculate. The FAA should be proving these statements. "Unusual" is an empty phrase when you're talking about millions of flight hours. Is it 1/100 flights unusual? 1/10 million flights unusual? The FAA can and should have obtained data on the activations of MCAS from the world wide fleet, and also compare on other similar aircraft (other 737s) how often MCAS activation conditions would have been met.
- jacquesm 6y ago
  I suspect that is because that would really blow up. It would show how many 'near misses' (thanks, George Carlin) there were and that number is likely a lot higher than the number of crashes. Keep in mind that without that data we are all focused on the two times MCAS led to crashes, we are all in the dark how widespread the problem really was and once that data is out in the open the FAA's reputation (or what is left of it) will be further down the drain.
  - VBprogrammer 6y ago
    Getting into the region of flight where MCAS operates by design on a commercial flight is already embarrassingly sloppy flying. The number of sick bags required on the flight would be a fair proxy. Unless we are talking about the number of times MCAS activated outside of its design criteria but didn't result in a crash. For example, as is presumed to have happened on the flight before the Lion air accident.
    - jacquesm 6y ago
      > Unless we are talking about the number of times MCAS activated outside of its design criteria but didn't result in a crash. Yes, that was what I had in mind. You can bet that on every plane that did not have the secondary input to the MCAS system this happened. Two crashes are the very ugly tip of a much larger iceberg and the FAA has a vested interest in keeping that iceberg submerged.
    - linuxftw 6y ago
      > Getting into the region of flight where MCAS operates by design on a commercial flight is already embarrassingly sloppy flying. You assume. If we had the data, we'd know how often the 737 MAX, which has different flight characteristics than other aircraft, was actually in those conditions.
      - VBprogrammer 6y ago
        In the same way in which one assumes pigs don't fly. You seem to be in the belief that 737 Max aircraft are uniquely predisposed to being hand flown around the sky on the edge of the stall while in the clean configuration and are expecting evidence of the contrary to be provided to you.
        linuxftw 6y ago
        > expecting evidence of the contrary to be provided to you. I'm expecting evidence to confirm the assumptions of the system. I'm assuming any and all available data would be gathered and analyzed. I assume the MCAS system from top to bottom is riddled with bugs and flaws, designed by committee rather than engineers. There's no reason to trust any line of reasoning from Boeing on this matter, they've already demonstrated their incompetence and are not trustworthy. You seem to not want the FAA to verify the claims of the system with data. I don't know why that would be undesirable. Even if they only confirm what is being stated about MCAS activation, that data would be valuable and demonstrate that the FAA has at least the competence to gather the data. Publishing the raw data along with their conclusions would allow the public to verify their competence at drawing conclusions.

linuxftw 6y ago

There's no need to speculate. The FAA should be proving these statements. "Unusual" is an empty phrase when you're talking about millions of flight hours. Is it 1/100 flights unusual? 1/10 million flights unusual? The FAA can and should have obtained data on the activations of MCAS from the world wide fleet, and also compare on other similar aircraft (other 737s) how often MCAS activation conditions would have been met.

jacquesm 6y ago
I suspect that is because that would really blow up. It would show how many 'near misses' (thanks, George Carlin) there were and that number is likely a lot higher than the number of crashes. Keep in mind that without that data we are all focused on the two times MCAS led to crashes, we are all in the dark how widespread the problem really was and once that data is out in the open the FAA's reputation (or what is left of it) will be further down the drain.
- VBprogrammer 6y ago
  Getting into the region of flight where MCAS operates by design on a commercial flight is already embarrassingly sloppy flying. The number of sick bags required on the flight would be a fair proxy. Unless we are talking about the number of times MCAS activated outside of its design criteria but didn't result in a crash. For example, as is presumed to have happened on the flight before the Lion air accident.
  - jacquesm 6y ago
    > Unless we are talking about the number of times MCAS activated outside of its design criteria but didn't result in a crash. Yes, that was what I had in mind. You can bet that on every plane that did not have the secondary input to the MCAS system this happened. Two crashes are the very ugly tip of a much larger iceberg and the FAA has a vested interest in keeping that iceberg submerged.
  - linuxftw 6y ago
    > Getting into the region of flight where MCAS operates by design on a commercial flight is already embarrassingly sloppy flying. You assume. If we had the data, we'd know how often the 737 MAX, which has different flight characteristics than other aircraft, was actually in those conditions.
    - VBprogrammer 6y ago
      In the same way in which one assumes pigs don't fly. You seem to be in the belief that 737 Max aircraft are uniquely predisposed to being hand flown around the sky on the edge of the stall while in the clean configuration and are expecting evidence of the contrary to be provided to you.
      - linuxftw 6y ago
        > expecting evidence of the contrary to be provided to you. I'm expecting evidence to confirm the assumptions of the system. I'm assuming any and all available data would be gathered and analyzed. I assume the MCAS system from top to bottom is riddled with bugs and flaws, designed by committee rather than engineers. There's no reason to trust any line of reasoning from Boeing on this matter, they've already demonstrated their incompetence and are not trustworthy. You seem to not want the FAA to verify the claims of the system with data. I don't know why that would be undesirable. Even if they only confirm what is being stated about MCAS activation, that data would be valuable and demonstrate that the FAA has at least the competence to gather the data. Publishing the raw data along with their conclusions would allow the public to verify their competence at drawing conclusions.