5 ms·

Slighlty offtopic, but it's ironic how a service with the tagline "Online backups for the truly paranoid" serves insecure connections to its website and doesn't

Slighlty offtopic, but it's ironic how a service with the tagline "Online backups for the truly paranoid" serves insecure connections to its website and doesn't employ HSTS. Especially since the user is expected to download the client for the service from that website. Kind of a reckless decision.

cperciva 6y ago
Especially since the user is expected to download the client for the service from that website. You mean the GPG-signed client code?
- beervirus 6y ago
  Well yeah but the GPG key is also served insecurely: http://www.tarsnap.com/tarsnap-signing-key-2020.asc http://www.tarsnap.com/tarsnap-signing-key-2020.asc
  - cperciva 6y ago
    ... you know you can change that URL to start "https" if you like?
    - beervirus 6y ago
      With HSTS, you don't have to.
    - ifdefdebug 6y ago
      Of course you are right, but some commonly accepted procedure nowadays is to do that automatically with a redirect, as a service for the user. Sure, you may have a reason for not to do so, but instead of dismissing a valid argument you could maybe explain why not ... Edit: On second thought, I recognize this whole subthread started with the wrong tone ("ironic", "reckless"), kind of dismissive or patronizing and not calling for a constructive discussion, so please disregard this comment of mine, sorry.
      - _-___________-_ 6y ago
        I do think that a certain level of scrutiny is invited by using a term like "for the truly paranoid".
- cedilla 6y ago
  Well, if the user actually checks the signatures and remembers from their last visit that their should be one coming along with the software, maybe. That's a big if though. Considering there's no disadvantage in deploying HSTS and there's no good reason to serve an insecure website, especially since they already have HTTPS set up, I'm baffled by that decision. Maybe it's just an oversight but that's not too reassuring either.
  - arghwhat 6y ago
    > Well, if the user actually checks the signatures and remembers from their last visit that their should be one coming along with the software, maybe. That's a big if though. HTTPS+HSTS adds no security here. The only (reasonable) way to validate a payload end-to-end is an offline signature validation. This is true regardless of transport-level security measures like HTTPS. Doing this properly with gpg makes even more sense due to the service targeting the paranoid, who is exactly the group of individuals who are certain to validate a signature. > Considering there's no disadvantage in deploying HSTS and there's no good reason to serve an insecure website, especially since they already have HTTPS set up, I'm baffled by that decision. Maybe it's just an oversight but that's not too reassuring either. It's easy, but adds nothing in ways of security here. Just privacy. (Not that privacy does not have value, of course, but that's an entirely different argument.)
    - cperciva 6y ago
      Assuming your attacker can count bytes, there's no privacy added by using TLS to download static content from the Tarsnap website. There simply aren't enough similarly-sized files.
      - fungizid 6y ago
        But such an attacker would need to know that the content was downloaded from the Tarsnap website, right? If TLS is configured with Encrypted SNI, the handshake no longer reveals server information and thereby TLS does add privacy. (However, Encrypted SNI is not widely adopted yet.)
dylz 6y ago
I'm pretty sure the preferred download method is via FreeBSD ports ;)
rlpb 6y ago
Surely "truly paranoid" people don't rely on a website using HSTS and hit it with HTTPS directly?

cperciva 6y ago

Especially since the user is expected to download the client for the service from that website. You mean the GPG-signed client code?

beervirus 6y ago
Well yeah but the GPG key is also served insecurely: http://www.tarsnap.com/tarsnap-signing-key-2020.asc http://www.tarsnap.com/tarsnap-signing-key-2020.asc
- cperciva 6y ago
  ... you know you can change that URL to start "https" if you like?
  - beervirus 6y ago
    With HSTS, you don't have to.
  - ifdefdebug 6y ago
    Of course you are right, but some commonly accepted procedure nowadays is to do that automatically with a redirect, as a service for the user. Sure, you may have a reason for not to do so, but instead of dismissing a valid argument you could maybe explain why not ... Edit: On second thought, I recognize this whole subthread started with the wrong tone ("ironic", "reckless"), kind of dismissive or patronizing and not calling for a constructive discussion, so please disregard this comment of mine, sorry.
    - _-___________-_ 6y ago
      I do think that a certain level of scrutiny is invited by using a term like "for the truly paranoid".
cedilla 6y ago
Well, if the user actually checks the signatures and remembers from their last visit that their should be one coming along with the software, maybe. That's a big if though. Considering there's no disadvantage in deploying HSTS and there's no good reason to serve an insecure website, especially since they already have HTTPS set up, I'm baffled by that decision. Maybe it's just an oversight but that's not too reassuring either.
- arghwhat 6y ago
  > Well, if the user actually checks the signatures and remembers from their last visit that their should be one coming along with the software, maybe. That's a big if though. HTTPS+HSTS adds no security here. The only (reasonable) way to validate a payload end-to-end is an offline signature validation. This is true regardless of transport-level security measures like HTTPS. Doing this properly with gpg makes even more sense due to the service targeting the paranoid, who is exactly the group of individuals who are certain to validate a signature. > Considering there's no disadvantage in deploying HSTS and there's no good reason to serve an insecure website, especially since they already have HTTPS set up, I'm baffled by that decision. Maybe it's just an oversight but that's not too reassuring either. It's easy, but adds nothing in ways of security here. Just privacy. (Not that privacy does not have value, of course, but that's an entirely different argument.)
  - cperciva 6y ago
    Assuming your attacker can count bytes, there's no privacy added by using TLS to download static content from the Tarsnap website. There simply aren't enough similarly-sized files.
    - fungizid 6y ago
      But such an attacker would need to know that the content was downloaded from the Tarsnap website, right? If TLS is configured with Encrypted SNI, the handshake no longer reveals server information and thereby TLS does add privacy. (However, Encrypted SNI is not widely adopted yet.)

dylz 6y ago

I'm pretty sure the preferred download method is via FreeBSD ports ;)

rlpb 6y ago

Surely "truly paranoid" people don't rely on a website using HSTS and hit it with HTTPS directly?