4 ms·
Questions: - Do the graphs mean that the "sign" operation of OpenSSL when using ECDSA is many times faster and the "verify" operation is ~4 times slower (compa
by zepearl 6y ago
Questions:
- Do the graphs mean that the "sign" operation of OpenSSL when using ECDSA is many times faster and the "verify" operation is ~4 times slower (compared to RSA)?
- I suppose that "sign" is linked to issuing certificates, while "verify" would be involved to checking certificates?
(sorry, I'm not a pro with this stuff)
- wbl 6y agoYou are exactly correct on both points!
- toast0 6y agoIf it were just checking and issuing certificates, faster signing and slower verifying would be a bad tradeoff, since certificates are issued once and used many times; certificate size benefits notwithstanding. The really nice thing performance wise is that when sending a certificate via TLS, you need to sign the TLS exchange up to that point. Making that faster means you can support a lot more connection handshakes with the same server.
- zepearl 6y agoInteresting, thank you! (this would have been my next question, hehe)
- pinjiz 6y agoYes, that is correct! It makes sense to use ECDSA for leaf certificates, because the TLS server can then handle more clients compared to a RSA based certificate of the same strength (the private key operation is much cheaper with ECDSA and is needed for every TLS handshake). The client of course, needs a few more cycles to verify the signature, but that is not noticeable most of the time. IMHO it does not really make sense to use a ECDSA root certificate unless you have a very constrained environment, where every byte counts. The root certificate will never be transferred to the client during a TLS handshake - so the size benefit is minimal (the intermediate certificate will be a bit smaller, because ECDSA signatures are smaller). But the signature validation will take more cycles on the client in every TLS handshake. Other than that it is a good thing that Let's Encrypt now has an ECDSA root. When researchers might find a problem with RSA in the future, we have an alternative ready to use.