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>Intercepting supply chains for stock parts inside of China is not [the NSA's] specialty >Another attack, given the open source nature of the device, could be
by javajosh 6y ago
>Intercepting supply chains for stock parts inside of China is not [the NSA's] specialty
>Another attack, given the open source nature of the device, could be distributing cheap, compromised units broadly after the fact to ensure they are widely adopted.
I like thinking about high-level threat models as much as the next guy, but these two statements seem to be at odds. Unless by "compromised units" you don't mean what I think you mean.
- contingencies 6y agoFirst was referring to supply chain interdiction for third party fabricators attempting to produce non-compromised units. Second was referring to active fabrication and distribution of compromised units to unsuspecting consumers.
- javajosh 6y agoOh, ok. So its the difference between opening the box to put in a wayward chip, versus starting a factory who makes units with the wayward chip to begin with. Fair enough.