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>it stops people from having persistent access to your stuff. I can buy that, but that's far from the most likely danger on the internet. Usually it's the equ
by Groxx 16y ago
>it stops people from having persistent access to your stuff.
I can buy that, but that's far from the most likely danger on the internet. Usually it's the equivalent of a smash-and-grab job; break in, download everything of value within minutes, never go back (unless you can install a trojan, bypassing passwords anyway). Because going back in multiple times raises flags.
And every system with any reasonable need for security should detect questionable access from new locations, and block them until they are verified. Not all of them do, of course.
The must-change-password tradition seems more and more like a blind dogma for proper systems, because it's a slightly-effective bandaid for really crappy ones. I have yet to see a reason why, in an even half-way decent system, it's not actually a detriment due to weakened passwords / people writing them down where others can see.
>Once I've got the hashes...
... you've already got access to all the info in their database, likely in their entire networked system. That's infinitely more destructive - all those passwords can be changed within days, rendering them useless for re-entry. And it's safe to assume that they will do so, as per above in an even half-way decent system with any kind of logging whatsoever.
As a bandaid for systems which need a bandaid, I admit, they do have (minor) advantages. But such systems shouldn't exist in the first place, and are less and less of an option for newer systems, as proper setups are getting easier and easier to create. And I fear that, as long as they're seen as an effective bandaid, the weaker systems will be more likely to be used because there's an effective bandaid to improve their security. And such systems are usually more vulnerable to trojans, which are a far greater and more real danger than someone guessing someone's password.
- Xurinos 16y ago> Usually it's the equivalent of a smash-and-grab job; break in, download everything of value within minutes Is that still the case? I was under the impression that these days, account/identity access has black market value. People sell each other lists of accesses. That means there is a certain -- maybe even significant -- amount of time between when somebody has cracked your password and when somebody will make use of that access.
- Groxx 16y agoWhich is after someone has made a dump of all the user info from a database. Which should be detectable by any logging software. Which means the company should have taken steps within the day to change all passwords. And again, this is what any company at all interested in security should be doing, and is relatively easy to do. Not what they all do. I'm arguing against the blind following of tradition, not that it isn't an easy way to improve things slightly at horrifyingly insecure locations. And if your security depends on changing your password routinely, you have much larger problems. All of this makes the passwords useful only for breaking into other sites, as people re-use passwords. It's the personal information that's valuable, not that the password was used at location X. A person's password entirely detached from its source is still valuable, because of that re-use. But a unique random password means they got nothing but a day's worth of access to the location they got it from, which they apparently already had, likely at a significantly-higher security level than you have. Changing it monthly helps this... how?