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>So are you proposing that people don't periodically change their passwords? This always gets me thinking. Why is it "good" to change your password periodical
by Groxx 16y ago
>So are you proposing that people don't periodically change their passwords?
This always gets me thinking.
Why is it "good" to change your password periodically? The only reason I can come up with is that, if someone gets your password, you prevent them from being able to use it if they sit on it for X months until your routine change comes through. To which I say "What?! Why would they wait that long?". It's a ridiculous assumption.
There's also that forcing changes (kind of) ensures system A doesn't use system B's password, so you don't lose everything if one account is compromised. But people get around that by having several that they cycle through, on all sites - mostly negating that argument. If they got in once, they can get in again, and (as below) each of those multiple passwords is more likely to be weaker.
Meanwhile, on the flip-side, we have that more frequent changes create weaker passwords, as they all have to be remembered, or trivially-guessable changes. Which means every password is easier to guess, or if the attacker sits on it for a few months, they can probably guess the one of a few hundred likely changes you made, and it really makes no difference that you changed it. Or they wrote it down and stuck it up somewhere, which means it's wide open to social hacking if you have any coworkers.
So the solution is to use a unique random value for each password, stored in a keychain somehow. At which point: why would changing it help? You would only lose the password if someone got your keychain, or hacked the system the password is used on and retrieved it. Either way, it's gone for good, immediately, and it wouldn't matter if you had changed it last week. And all you lost is that single account, which was lost the moment you lost the password anyway.
- iuguy 16y ago> Why is it "good" to change your password periodically? That depends on what it's being used for. Changing your password on systems you own (and monitor) might not be necessary if they're 'good enough', although if you can ditch passwords entirely that's much better (e.g. using One Time Pads, Public Key auth etc.) From a compliance perspective forcing people to periodically change passwords in theory means that while a certain amount of users will have insecure passwords, that over time this will change or rotate at least. In practice it doesn't generally work that way but COBIT tells us to do it anyway so we tick the box. If you don't own the system then you can't assume that the system hasn't been owned, so periodically changing passwords is seen to be a good thing(tm) as it stops people from having persistent access to your stuff. Again, real world deviates significantly on theory on this, but YMMV. The frequent changes don't necessarily create weaker passwords, they do disrupt password guessing slightly. For example, imagine organisation foo has a password policy requiring monthly changes. The default password is welcome1, so inevitably people change it to welcome2, welcome10 etc. Once I've got the hashes I see that I'm pulling off a lot of welcome1s, and welcome2 works as well. I do have to do some work to get the rest of the welcome<nn> and welcome<nnn> but on the whole it's fine, except for the guy that chooses a password that doesn't fit the common password ('that guy' with welcome1welcome2welcome as his password in this case). So it doesn't have a significantly measurable effect for all people, but may have for some. Yeah, it's still a load of rubbish though :) If the password is sufficiently complex then the keychain solution should work and changing it is unlikely to have any statistical effect unless someone's doing a very slow and long winded sequential brute force (in which case changing a password to earlier in the sequence may help, but that would require a priori knowledge of the sequence and position and is impractical). With the keychain solution the only measurable difference would be that the resulting password would be better, worse or the same in terms of complexity and length tradeoff, but that's down to the algorithm.
- Groxx 16y ago>it stops people from having persistent access to your stuff. I can buy that, but that's far from the most likely danger on the internet. Usually it's the equivalent of a smash-and-grab job; break in, download everything of value within minutes, never go back (unless you can install a trojan, bypassing passwords anyway). Because going back in multiple times raises flags. And every system with any reasonable need for security should detect questionable access from new locations, and block them until they are verified. Not all of them do, of course. The must-change-password tradition seems more and more like a blind dogma for proper systems, because it's a slightly-effective bandaid for really crappy ones. I have yet to see a reason why, in an even half-way decent system, it's not actually a detriment due to weakened passwords / people writing them down where others can see. >Once I've got the hashes... ... you've already got access to all the info in their database, likely in their entire networked system. That's infinitely more destructive - all those passwords can be changed within days, rendering them useless for re-entry. And it's safe to assume that they will do so, as per above in an even half-way decent system with any kind of logging whatsoever. As a bandaid for systems which need a bandaid, I admit, they do have (minor) advantages. But such systems shouldn't exist in the first place, and are less and less of an option for newer systems, as proper setups are getting easier and easier to create. And I fear that, as long as they're seen as an effective bandaid, the weaker systems will be more likely to be used because there's an effective bandaid to improve their security. And such systems are usually more vulnerable to trojans, which are a far greater and more real danger than someone guessing someone's password.
- Xurinos 16y ago> Usually it's the equivalent of a smash-and-grab job; break in, download everything of value within minutes Is that still the case? I was under the impression that these days, account/identity access has black market value. People sell each other lists of accesses. That means there is a certain -- maybe even significant -- amount of time between when somebody has cracked your password and when somebody will make use of that access.
- Groxx 16y ago
- b0rsuk 16y ago>Why is it "good" to change your password periodically? I don't get it - why does no one mention the most obvious reason ? Is this a trap set up by math nazis ? I have this feeling I may be the stupidest person in the room. For the sake of argument, let's say all passwords on a server are numbers from 0 to 99. An attacker using a brute-force attack can try 5 passwords per day. So it will take at most 20 days to crack it. First day the chance is 5/100 = 1/20, second day is 5/95 = 1/19, third day is 5/90 = 1/18 and so forth#. So, as the time passes, it is more and more likely that the password will be cracked, because some combinations have already been tried. It's not 5/100 forever ! Now if you're forced to reset your password, the chance of guessing the password is restored to 5/100. We can ponder the wisdom of forcing password changes if they take, say, 50 years to break with brute force. When the change is forced each year, chance is restored from 1/49 per year to 1/50 per year. Big deal ? # There's a fairly simple formula for calculating the chance of k successes over n trials, given p probability of success in each trial . http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernoulli_trial http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernoulli_trial
- Groxx 16y agoI think you missed iuguy's last paragraph. A rebuttal is in order, because I've seen this argument before: First: assuming a long, slow, undetected brute force is running, you have just as many chances at the beginning of helping the attacker by moving closer to their starting point as you do increasing the distance. It's the same whether you change it or not. Second: a long, un-detected brute force? Bull. Third: decent passwords negate brute forces entirely. Trillions-of-years entirely. We've established that changing passwords when you have a horribly insecure system might minimally improve things, but we have not established that changing secure passwords in any way helps.
- iuguy 16y ago> Second: a long, un-detected brute force? Bull. About 6 years ago this happened to us. A slow but persistent SSH brute force was targeting one of our servers. After we spotted it (it was an SSH brute force and because it was slow we didn't detect it over the noise of general SSH scans on port 22) we switched to public key auth only on the server and installed fail2ban.