6 ms·

Because packet formats are bad? I don't understand what you're trying to say here.

• pvg 6y ago
  Because a flexible 'format' or 'model' or whatever with which you can construct insecure systems or (hypothetically) secure systems, is not really useful, it ends up being inherently insecure.
• owenmarshall 6y ago
  Flexibility in cryptography is often very bad and opens doors to downgrade attacks or things like JWT’s alg:none issues. https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/05/16/agility.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/05/16/agility.html “Have one joint, and keep it well oiled.”
  • upofadown 6y ago
    The linked article is all about protecting data in flight like in the TLS case. PGP is all about protecting data at rest. The two applications are fundamentally different.
    • pvg 6y ago
      I think you're misunderstanding the general complaint or maybe not the complaint but how general, rather than specific it is. At the top of the thread someone says 'PGP has all this ancient cruft and also isn't good for email/email is maybe unsecurable anyway'. The PGP-enthusiast response to that is 'No problem! You see, PGP is so flexible, you can build anything out of it, including maybe an actually-secure system of some sort'. This is a fundamentally inadequate response and we've realized it's inadequate and don't really design secure systems like that anymore. In fact, this class of concern has permeated almost all aspects of contemporary software systems design rather than being something narrowly limited to 'crypto algo agility is bad'. Here's an example/illustrative timeline that doesn't have anything to do with 'data at rest'. 1998 Netscape: Behold our cross-platform, cross-language super-toolkit for building super-extensible Enterprise Groupware apps. Also one of them is a web browser! 2015 Mozilla: [belated forehead slap] This is a terrible way to architect a web browser that has any hope of offering end-user security.
      • upofadown 6y ago
        How do you do a downgrade attack on, say, an encrypted backup?
        • pvg 6y ago
          I guess I don't understand how that's a response to anything I've written in this thread. Edit: I'll expand the quote from the original thing a bit if it helps: (Open)PGP is first and foremost a flexible packet format (and other specs), and GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it -- all of it. You can build something that hides metadata, you can have forward secrecy, and encryption always-on by default with PGP (and GnuPG). You can use it for whatever trust model you want, neither OpenPGP (the specs) nor GnuPG prescribe a certain model. It provides building blocks. This is a huge 'nope'. It's, by this point, an uncontroversial, well-understood nope. A known-nope, if you will! The only people who don't seem to think so are PGP people and that, in itself, is rather telling.
          • upofadown 6y ago
            You can't just "Nope" this issue. You need to come up with some sort of rational argument. The PGP people have been dealing with the data at rest issue since forever. It is a bit presumptuous to just write off all that acquired wisdom without reason.
            • pvg 6y ago
              I have come up with a rational argument, you just refuse to address it at all. Your argument boils down to 'the PGP people are smarter than everyone else' which I think isn't really even a rational argument.
              • upofadown 6y ago
                There is no reason to appeal to authority here when a simple koan can provide enlightenment. I will repeat it one more time: How do you do a downgrade attack on, say, an encrypted backup?
• rakoo 6y ago
  Because flexibility brings bugs, and bugs in cryptography means breach of security.