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> the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing's engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing's management My expe

> the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing's engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing's management My experience in this industry is that many of the most important engineering decisions are made by management. Not to excuse their engineers, but on the topic of management getting of lightly, I wonder how many of those "faulty technical assumptions" should fall at the feet of Boeing's management.

mywittyname 6y ago
The only engineers with real power are the ones that own the company. And even then, they can still be out-maneuvered by politically astute executives. Engineers are almost never to blame in these situations, even if they are the direct cause of an issue. There's usually so many of them that someone catches problems. But they are powerless to do much more than send a strongly worded email to their management. Until C-suites and board members are held personally liable for tragedies like this, I doubt much will ever change. There's no real incentive to fix problems, when it costs too much money because the worst thing that will happen is, a few years down the road, there might be a Congressional inquiry and a modest fine. Of course, any engineer whose malfeasance costs the company even 0.001% of that fine will find themselves in jail at the behest of company leadership, even if no lives were lost or any measurable damage was done to the company..
- bumby 6y ago
  >Engineers are almost never to blame in these situations I strongly disagree with this. Engineering is a profession of public trust, even if operating under an industrial exemption to circumnavigate licensure. We need to hold ourselves accountable to those standards or else it risks becoming a vocation devoid of responsibility and lacking accountability similar to the C-suite positions that people rail against in this thread. I don't think society would cut a doctor or lawyer slack for 'just doing as they're told' and I think engineers are in the same area of public trust. Good organizations should have dissenting opinion processes. The advantage is that it gives a way to hold management accountable (e.g., they must formally acknowledge that risk). Sure, using that process may come with professional risk, but that should come with the territory of a position of public trust.
  - mywittyname 6y ago
    No engineer had the power to veto this move by the company, just like no engineer had veto power over the Challenger launch or any of the other numerous tragedies we all discuss in our ethics classes. Attempts were made to prevent the tragedies, but nobody in charge listened. The fault lies with the person who has final authority over the decision. If I make a mistake, which is discovered, as long as I attempt to correct the problem, I'm absolved of fault. A miscalculation is an accident. Knowingly deploying a faulty device due miscalculation is malfeasance. I may have made the calculation, but I never made the decision to let it kill people.
    - bumby 6y ago
      I think where we disagree is the level of responsibility for "final authority". If an engineer knowingly designs a failure, they should be held responsible as should the management. I don't think those two responsibilities of engineers and management are mutually exclusive. I don't know about how NASA handled dissenting opinions in the Challenger days but my understanding is they have grown into more of a risk-informed decision making culture. I do think they have engineers who can stop work and force management to formally accept that risk nowadays. I don't know if Boeing has similar processes. This isn't a miscalculation scenario. This is knowingly not following their own processes. At least according the the hazard analysis reported by the Seattle times, their own processes said there should have been a default redundant sensor. Not as optional equipment, but as the default configuration. The engineer may not have the final say but they do have a responsibility to drive that risk decision. If they know they are doing something dangerous or unethical, in my (perhaps unpopular) opinion they have a responsibility to voice that or leave. I say that as somebody who has been pressured in these types of decisions in an aerospace domain. Challenger was somewhat different. Challenger was from a lack of temperature data, meaning they didn't have a good probabilistic rationale for either GO/NOGO decision. In hindsight, the safe bet was to wait for conditions that fell within the known data. As I understand the Boeing case, they identified the hazard but didn't follow their own procedures to mitigate it. That isn't really the same case of an "known unknown" but rather an "known known" that they didn't mitigate. I do think the engineers are culpable to a certain extent there. Edit: >I may have made the calculation, but I never made the decision to let it kill people. I think this may go along with our differing opinions on the standards of the profession. In my view, there is a certain level of expected competence one should be held accountable for. That’s why doctors can be sued for negligence even if it was an “honest mistake”
HumblyTossed 6y ago
> I wonder how many of those "faulty technical assumptions" should fall at the feet of Boeing's management. Most. If engineering has to be subordinate to management and not equal, then management must take responsibility for their decisions.
ulfw 6y ago
The lines get thin once you get into the realms of “Engineering Management”
choward 6y ago
It reminds me of people who blame programmers for "dark patterns". Sure, they implement them but they aren't the ones who decide that they should be implemented. However, both programmers and Boeing engineers could (should) quit if they feel what they are doing is unethical.

mywittyname 6y ago

The only engineers with real power are the ones that own the company. And even then, they can still be out-maneuvered by politically astute executives. Engineers are almost never to blame in these situations, even if they are the direct cause of an issue. There's usually so many of them that someone catches problems. But they are powerless to do much more than send a strongly worded email to their management. Until C-suites and board members are held personally liable for tragedies like this, I doubt much will ever change. There's no real incentive to fix problems, when it costs too much money because the worst thing that will happen is, a few years down the road, there might be a Congressional inquiry and a modest fine. Of course, any engineer whose malfeasance costs the company even 0.001% of that fine will find themselves in jail at the behest of company leadership, even if no lives were lost or any measurable damage was done to the company..

bumby 6y ago
>Engineers are almost never to blame in these situations I strongly disagree with this. Engineering is a profession of public trust, even if operating under an industrial exemption to circumnavigate licensure. We need to hold ourselves accountable to those standards or else it risks becoming a vocation devoid of responsibility and lacking accountability similar to the C-suite positions that people rail against in this thread. I don't think society would cut a doctor or lawyer slack for 'just doing as they're told' and I think engineers are in the same area of public trust. Good organizations should have dissenting opinion processes. The advantage is that it gives a way to hold management accountable (e.g., they must formally acknowledge that risk). Sure, using that process may come with professional risk, but that should come with the territory of a position of public trust.
- mywittyname 6y ago
  No engineer had the power to veto this move by the company, just like no engineer had veto power over the Challenger launch or any of the other numerous tragedies we all discuss in our ethics classes. Attempts were made to prevent the tragedies, but nobody in charge listened. The fault lies with the person who has final authority over the decision. If I make a mistake, which is discovered, as long as I attempt to correct the problem, I'm absolved of fault. A miscalculation is an accident. Knowingly deploying a faulty device due miscalculation is malfeasance. I may have made the calculation, but I never made the decision to let it kill people.
  - bumby 6y ago
    I think where we disagree is the level of responsibility for "final authority". If an engineer knowingly designs a failure, they should be held responsible as should the management. I don't think those two responsibilities of engineers and management are mutually exclusive. I don't know about how NASA handled dissenting opinions in the Challenger days but my understanding is they have grown into more of a risk-informed decision making culture. I do think they have engineers who can stop work and force management to formally accept that risk nowadays. I don't know if Boeing has similar processes. This isn't a miscalculation scenario. This is knowingly not following their own processes. At least according the the hazard analysis reported by the Seattle times, their own processes said there should have been a default redundant sensor. Not as optional equipment, but as the default configuration. The engineer may not have the final say but they do have a responsibility to drive that risk decision. If they know they are doing something dangerous or unethical, in my (perhaps unpopular) opinion they have a responsibility to voice that or leave. I say that as somebody who has been pressured in these types of decisions in an aerospace domain. Challenger was somewhat different. Challenger was from a lack of temperature data, meaning they didn't have a good probabilistic rationale for either GO/NOGO decision. In hindsight, the safe bet was to wait for conditions that fell within the known data. As I understand the Boeing case, they identified the hazard but didn't follow their own procedures to mitigate it. That isn't really the same case of an "known unknown" but rather an "known known" that they didn't mitigate. I do think the engineers are culpable to a certain extent there. Edit: >I may have made the calculation, but I never made the decision to let it kill people. I think this may go along with our differing opinions on the standards of the profession. In my view, there is a certain level of expected competence one should be held accountable for. That’s why doctors can be sued for negligence even if it was an “honest mistake”

HumblyTossed 6y ago

> I wonder how many of those "faulty technical assumptions" should fall at the feet of Boeing's management. Most. If engineering has to be subordinate to management and not equal, then management must take responsibility for their decisions.

ulfw 6y ago

The lines get thin once you get into the realms of “Engineering Management”

choward 6y ago

It reminds me of people who blame programmers for "dark patterns". Sure, they implement them but they aren't the ones who decide that they should be implemented. However, both programmers and Boeing engineers could (should) quit if they feel what they are doing is unethical.