Thanks for the cite. Here is the pdf simson.net/ref/1963/God_And_Golem_Inc.pdf I suspect (not having yet read the above beyond the preface) the root issue is,

Thanks for the cite. Here is the pdf simson.net/ref/1963/God_And_Golem_Inc.pdf I suspect (not having yet read the above beyond the preface) the root issue is, as usual, the nature of consciousness. My own views on that subject are fringe per du jour orthodoxy which states that 'mind arises from structure'. Weiner seems to take it for granted that an algorithm "learned" something. Does an algorithm even have a "self" that would "learn"? I personally think we're being careless with word usage. Once you contest the implicit equivalence made between 'form' and 'meaning' which occurs when one asserts that a mechanical/causal device has "learned" something -- all we have observed is form in -> form out -- then the 2 remaining "points in cybernetics" are "[machine] self-reproduction", and, "man-machine coordination". These last two are difficult topics -only- if generously attribute "consciousness" to machines that auto-extend their state transition map. Otherwise, they are interesting but not cosmic questions. And further, one can still entertain a 'Universal Mind' and speculations such as Leibniz's monadology, happily coexiting with a science of cybernetics.