You are being far too kind. The things you mention are the essence of a threat model. The fact that the article mentions none of those things and instead propos

You are being far too kind. The things you mention are the essence of a threat model. The fact that the article mentions none of those things and instead proposes something that can not, by any reasonable definition, be considered threat modeling and the fact that they think what they propose is threat modeling demonstrates gross systemic incompetence in their security organization. In no universe can this: "A threat model is a collaborative security exercise where we evaluate and validate the design and task planning for a new or existing service." be considered the definition of a threat model. It mentions nothing of "threats" or modeling them and at no point in the article do they describe actual threat modeling, so this is not a disconnect between definition and action. They also mention: "Then, holistically evaluate the entire surface area and develop the most likely points of compromise. This is the key deliverable." which again completely misses the point of threat modeling as that is identifying where they are weak, not where they will be attacked (though they are likely to be related). This is conflating "know your self" and "know your enemy" which is ridiculous. What they appear to actually be describing in the article is the most rudimentary security process of actually evaluating their own systems which is a prerequisite for a functional security process since you can not shore up weaknesses without understanding where they are. So, my best possible interpretation is that their security organization seems to think "threat modeling" is a catch-all term for any security process which is a baffling degree of institutional incompetence.