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I am not advocating that, in fact I am with you in how bad it is, but I am also telling what the incentive structure looks like and what would it take to move i

I am not advocating that, in fact I am with you in how bad it is, but I am also telling what the incentive structure looks like and what would it take to move it to the other equilibrium point. There are many and different types of agents in this game and appeals to morality or apocalypticism just don't work on them. There needs to be a concrete, depolarizing, global leadership that coordinates this transition, to make sure parties don't defect despite cheating being very profitable, and they also believe that this will be the case with others. Paris agreement was an attempt at this but also demonstrated that we still couldn't muster the political will to do anything sufficiently concrete. Unlike nuclear weapons, which has much fewer agents to coordinate with and a more immediately imaginable impact, climate change proves to be difficult problem regarding the nature of coordination it requires and ease of popularizing the policies around it. We need tools to match that difficulty.

throwaway894345 6y ago
Thanks for clarifying. I don’t see why the Paris Agreement is a useful analog for a carbon tax. A carbon tax doesn’t depend on the good faith of partner countries, but the border adjustment itself incentivizes other countries to reduce their emissions (they want to trade with us). The more wealthy countries who implement a carbon tax with border adjustment, the stronger this incentive mechanism becomes. There is a political problem in getting a larger block of wealthy countries on board, but it’s not unrealistic to think of Europe and North America forming that initial block, and surely there’s enough wealth in those markets that it would incentivize other countries to get on board. In whatever case, I can’t imagine an environmental solution that won’t have the same (or worse) political problems. As far as I can tell, border adjuster carbon tax most neatly and efficiently aligns incentives.

throwaway894345 6y ago

Thanks for clarifying. I don’t see why the Paris Agreement is a useful analog for a carbon tax. A carbon tax doesn’t depend on the good faith of partner countries, but the border adjustment itself incentivizes other countries to reduce their emissions (they want to trade with us). The more wealthy countries who implement a carbon tax with border adjustment, the stronger this incentive mechanism becomes. There is a political problem in getting a larger block of wealthy countries on board, but it’s not unrealistic to think of Europe and North America forming that initial block, and surely there’s enough wealth in those markets that it would incentivize other countries to get on board. In whatever case, I can’t imagine an environmental solution that won’t have the same (or worse) political problems. As far as I can tell, border adjuster carbon tax most neatly and efficiently aligns incentives.