The problem for any proof of work system is there are really only three possibilities- 1. No set of coordinated attackers with significant (state-level) resou

The problem for any proof of work system is there are really only three possibilities- 1. No set of coordinated attackers with significant (state-level) resources- think, say, Manhattan Project- exists. If this is the case, the network is not a serious threat to existing power structures. And, at that point, why not just use a system with a diverse set of trusted coordinators? 2. The total resources used on PoW are less than any such set of attackers can collectively use. In this case, the network is insecure. 3. The total resources used on PoW are more than any such set of attackers can use. In this case, the network may be secure, but the resource usage is also incredibly high- again, we're talking about trillions of dollars a year- what a set of coordinating states and big banks could plausibly spend to stop something that actually threatened them. And it's worse than that, actually- the network must spend that much all the time, but the attackers only need to spend that much when they want to attack. And this isn't even considering that an attacker may be able to appropriate, or even nationalize, large mining farms. So any PoW network, as far as I can tell, must either be no more than a relatively minor annoyance to world governments and those in power, be insecure, or consume resources on an almost unimaginable level- and have all the users of the network pay for those resources. That clean, unused, overprovisioned hydro power? Yeah, it's also cheap. That means, to maintain a given security level, you need to use more of it- an attacker has access to the same cheap power legitimate users do, and may well be able to shut legitimate users out! Please let me know if I'm wrong, but the choice seems to be "boring, insecure, crime-against-humanity- pick one."