2 ms·
If you're designing things where you expect this to be an issue you can do a few things to ease your path: Firstly you want to have a clear distinction between
by tialaramex 6y ago
If you're designing things where you expect this to be an issue you can do a few things to ease your path:
Firstly you want to have a clear distinction between "Things that it's fine to just ignore because you don't understand them" and "Things that if you don't understand them that means you're screwed, abort". For example in PNG some of the bitflags cunningly concealed in the capitalisation of the extension chunk names indicate whether it's OK to just ignore the chunk if you don't understand it, and whether it's OK to just copy this chunk across into a modified image without understanding it. In X.509 there's a bitflag that means "If you don't understand this part of the certificate then you mustn't rely on the certificate at all".
Then you need a way for people to agree on how to allocate the extensions. The IETF has an impressive array of different mechanisms available, from "You need to actually write and publish a Standards Track document" to "First Come First Served" which suit different purposes. Consider just copying some or all of them. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8126 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8126
TLS had big problems with (non-)interoperability and as a security feature couldn't just shrug and put up with never moving forward so it had to endure painful upgrades each time. This time they got GREASE (RFC 8701) to try to stop this ever happening again. Basically they agree how to extend things, then, reserve some of the extension namespace and routinely shove crap into it on purpose. Things that properly understand how extensions work will go "Eh, I don't understand this" and ignore the crap. Everything else explodes, and you catch the explosions early because they happen everywhere all the time with all the GREASE you're using.
GREASing new features has become a go-to strategy and you should consider this too. For example Encrypted Client Hello (the current iteration of ESNI) is intended to be used for all connections. Basically every server you talk to, you always say "Also here's an encrypted hello". Maybe the server can read it and the plaintext hello was just a dummy - maybe it just reads the plaintext hello, an eavesdropper can't tell. So if they want to block encrypted hello, they have to block everything, even though probably very few servers will offer this feature at first.