This is an example of several interacting phenomena: 1. The U.S. patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 102 [0], says that "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unles

This is an example of several interacting phenomena: 1. The U.S. patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 102 [0], says that "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless ...." (Emphasis added.) This puts the burden on the patent examiner to prove un-patentability and not the other way around. By comparison: Imagine a Ph.D. program in which the candidate was entitled to a degree upon submission of a dissertation, with no need to do a literature review, unless the candidate's committee could come up with anticipatory research. That's how it is in the patent system: A patent applicant need only disclose "material" information of which the applicant is aware; there's no obligation to do a prior-art search. 2. Usually, a single patent examiner (possibly supervised during his- or her first few years) does the search and decides whether to allow a patent. The USPTO does have pre-issuance review procedures, but in the main, one, junior, civil servant — who might or might not know much about the relevant industry, as opposed to the relevant technology — 𝙞𝙣 𝙚𝙛𝙛𝙚𝙘𝙩 𝙢𝙖𝙠𝙚𝙨 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙮 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙞𝙧𝙚 𝙐𝙣𝙞𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙎𝙩𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙨. Sure, there are procedures for the USPTO to revisit the question of patentability. But those are expensive for challengers, as has been pointed out in TFA and in the comments here. 3. Patent law also requires that, if you want to invalidate a patent in court, it's up to you to prove the relevant facts — by "clear and convincing evidence," the highest standard of proof in civil law. Bottom line: The incentives provided by the patent system are not necessarily needed in the 21st century. It's high time to revisit, as the Supreme Court put it in 1966, "the underlying policy of the patent system that 'the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,' as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly." [0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/102 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/102 [1] *Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966), https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9105652591497305710 https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=910565259149730...