5 ms·
Someone should write a book like the little schemer but for physics. One of the best classes I took in college was somewhat like this. We measured the period of
by Alex3917 18y ago
Someone should write a book like the little schemer but for physics. One of the best classes I took in college was somewhat like this. We measured the period of the pendulum using our heartbeats, and we also measured how long it took things to roll down differently sloped ramps. From this we derived the period of the pendulum and the relationship between slope and speed. Eventually we used this to derive the universal law of gravitation using the period of the moon's orbit as the only given. It was pretty cool because there was no math involved. Instead of using calculus to derive the equations, we instead found them inductively by iterating over a couple thousand lines in excel and then looking for the pattern. The idea of the class was to understand physics by deriving all the equations the same way the people who discovered them did. It was pretty cool.
- deleted 18y ago[deleted]
- jfoutz 18y agoIf you look here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning you will see inductive reasoning is all about drawing broad conclusions from limited evidence. In this context, the tens or thousands of experiments are generalized to support some "theory" Every time i touch ice it is cold. By induction, all ice is cold. that's not "proof" but it's a great theory of ice.
- xlnt 18y agoIf you read Hume or Popper you will see that inductive reasoning is logically impossible, and therefore can't actually be what people do.
- deleted 18y ago[deleted]
- jfoutz 18y agoI think we do this, or something very much like it: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference I'll agree that we can set up a game we play with symbols and rules that doesn't permit inductive reasoning as valid. I can't agree that "what people do" has anything to do with logic.
- xlnt 18y agoBayesian Inference does not explain how new knowledge is created.
- byrneseyeview 18y agoIs it really going to fall apart because you aren't born with all the priors you would theoretically need?
- xlnt 18y agoI don't understand your question. But the point of science is to create new knowledge, so it seems highly relevant.
- schtog 18y ago"During the twentieth century, thinkers such as Karl Popper and David Miller have disputed the existence, necessity and validity of any inductive reasoning, including probabilistic (Bayesian) reasoning[citation n" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning On the other hand E Yudkowsky claims Poppers philosophy is a subset of Bayes Theorem(or wait dont take my words for that I might have misinterpretad), here is the link and quote: http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/bayes.html http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/bayes.html The Bayesian revolution in the sciences is fueled, not only by more and more cognitive scientists suddenly noticing that mental phenomena have Bayesian structure in them; not only by scientists in every field learning to judge their statistical methods by comparison with the Bayesian method; but also by the idea that science itself is a special case of Bayes' Theorem; experimental evidence is Bayesian evidence. The Bayesian revolutionaries hold that when you perform an experiment and get evidence that "confirms" or "disconfirms" your theory, this confirmation and disconfirmation is governed by the Bayesian rules. For example, you have to take into account, not only whether your theory predicts the phenomenon, but whether other possible explanations also predict the phenomenon. Previously, the most popular philosophy of science was probably Karl Popper's falsificationism - this is the old philosophy that the Bayesian revolution is currently dethroning. Karl Popper's idea that theories can be definitely falsified, but never definitely confirmed, is yet another special case of the Bayesian rules; if p(X|A) ~ 1 - if the theory makes a definite prediction - then observing ~X very strongly falsifies A. On the other hand, if p(X|A) ~ 1, and we observe X, this doesn't definitely confirm the theory; there might be some other condition B such that p(X|B) ~ 1, in which case observing X doesn't favor A over B. For observing X to definitely confirm A, we would have to know, not that p(X|A) ~ 1, but that p(X|~A) ~ 0, which is something that we can't know because we can't range over all possible alternative explanations. For example, when Einstein's theory of General Relativity toppled Newton's incredibly well-confirmed theory of gravity, it turned out that all of Newton's predictions were just a special case of Einstein's predictions. You can even formalize Popper's philosophy mathematically. The likelihood ratio for X, p(X|A)/p(X|~A), determines how much observing X slides the probability for A; the likelihood ratio is what says how strong X is as evidence. Well, in your theory A, you can predict X with probability 1, if you like; but you can't control the denominator of the likelihood ratio, p(X|~A) - there will always be some alternative theories that also predict X, and while we go with the simplest theory that fits the current evidence, you may someday encounter some evidence that an alternative theory predicts but your theory does not. That's the hidden gotcha that toppled Newton's theory of gravity. So there's a limit on how much mileage you can get from successful predictions; there's a limit on how high the likelihood ratio goes for confirmatory evidence. On the other hand, if you encounter some piece of evidence Y that is definitely not predicted by your theory, this is enormously strong evidence against your theory. If p(Y|A) is infinitesimal, then the likelihood ratio will also be infinitesimal. For example, if p(Y|A) is 0.0001%, and p(Y|~A) is 1%, then the likelihood ratio p(Y|A)/p(Y|~A) will be 1:10000. -40 decibels of evidence! Or flipping the likelihood ratio, if p(Y|A) is very small, then p(Y|~A)/p(Y|A) will be very large, meaning that observing Y greatly favors ~A over A. Falsification is much stronger than confirmation. This is a consequence of the earlier point that very strong evidence is not the product of a very high probability that A leads to X, but the product of a very low probability that not-A could have led to X. This is the precise Bayesian rule that underlies the heuristic value of Popper's falsificationism. Similarly, Popper's dictum that an idea must be falsifiable can be interpreted as a manifestation of the Bayesian conservation-of-probability rule; if a result X is positive evidence for the theory, then the result ~X would have disconfirmed the theory to some extent. If you try to interpret both X and ~X as "confirming" the theory, the Bayesian rules say this is impossible! To increase the probability of a theory you must expose it to tests that can potentially decrease its probability; this is not just a rule for detecting would-be cheaters in the social process of science, but a consequence of Bayesian probability theory. On the other hand, Popper's idea that there is only falsification and no such thing as confirmation turns out to be incorrect. Bayes' Theorem shows that falsification is very strong evidence compared to confirmation, but falsification is still probabilistic in nature; it is not governed by fundamentally different rules from confirmation, as Popper argued. So we find that many phenomena in the cognitive sciences, plus the statistical methods used by scientists, plus the scientific method itself, are all turning out to be special cases of Bayes' Theorem. Hence the Bayesian revolution.
- deleted 18y ago[deleted]
- pchristensen 18y agoWhat school/teacher? I'd be interested in finding a curriculum or any references about that. I have daughters and I'm dying to find a good way to present science to them.
- Alex3917 18y agoProf. Peter Stein at Cornell. The class is Physics 202. I can email you the class notes and problem sets if you'd like. I'll also email him and ask if he's thought about publishing the course materials online.
- pchristensen 18y agoThanks, I'd appreciate that. My email is in my profile.
- ph0rque 18y agoCan you just put them online somewhere?
- Alex3917 18y agohttp://www.alexkrupp.com/Phys202.zip http://www.alexkrupp.com/Phys202.zip If you glance at my answers to problem sets 4, 5, and 8 then you'll get the general idea of what the course involves. The problem sets are really fun because you're forced to play with the numbers and really understand the material. It might not be as hard as a traditional physics course, but it's every bit as rigorous in the real sense of the word. It's brilliance is that it really stresses the fundamentals, probably more so than any other physics material in existence. This is important because, as one professional Go player said after observing a Japanese baseball game, "In every confrontation with a real American professional team it seems that what we need to learn from them, besides their technique of course, is how uniformly faithful their players are to the fundamentals. Faithfulness to the fundamentals seems to be a common thread linking professionalism in all areas." (T. Kageyama)
- 18y ago
- smanek 18y agoTake a look at "The Road to Reality." It starts assuming nothing more than basic arithmetic, and builds up to differntial equations, tensors, string theory, quantum relativity, etc. I'm warning you up front that it's very math heavy. It takes some work to get through, but its worth it.