4 ms·
Yes, OpenBSD misc. So for HMAC. I've looked at it more and I think your point is valid (even tho it's not very likely to occur). I may add it as an option. I d
by 16s 16y ago
Yes, OpenBSD misc.
So for HMAC. I've looked at it more and I think your point is valid (even tho it's not very likely to occur). I may add it as an option. I don't really need to use it in the traditional sense (shared secret, integrity, etc) I only need it to better resist the length-extension attacks you point out.
Can the key and the message be the same? I'd rather not prompt the user for a base sentence and a key/salt. But I can't find anyone using HMAC where the key and the msg are the same. I thought you might have some insight into this.
Edit... here is a traditional HMAC (I think):
echo -n msg | openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -hmac key | openssl enc -base64
Here is how I would need to use it without changing functionality:
echo -n msg | openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -hmac msg | openssl enc -base64
I'm not sure this is proper from a cryptographic perspective.
- 16s 16y agoI got advice from some guys on sci.crypto about how to potentially handle this. Some smart guys on that list. So I'll probably incorporate HMAC as an option for those who wish to use it.