4 ms·

How is SSL hopelessly broken? Let us count the ways

14 points by sasvari 16y ago

willvarfar 16y ago
The biggest gaping hole ever is that most of the CAs can be pressured by most governments (and perhaps criminal enterprises) into giving out certificates if push came to shove. Pretty much every government has at least one root cert in their control, with which they can MITM each and every site ever. I don't think this aspect really gets the attention it deserves, as all the technical articles remain so technical. Its like not seeing the wood for the trees. My thought is to tie CAs to TLDs. If you want a certificate for a .uk domain, go to one of a select band of CAs for that TLD. And don't get upset when the British government ever does blantantly go snoop. But at least the Russians would have to hack it to do likewise.
- JoachimSchipper 16y ago
  You identify a real problem, but I'm not sold on your solution. There are lots of British companies on .com; on the other hand, do you really believe the US government wouldn't be able to get certificates for .uk (or, for that matter, .ir)? If nothing else, consider http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ (a rogue CA, based on MD5 collisions) and the declining security of SHA-1... Also, you have to be pretty good at security before using rogue CAs becomes worthwhile. Most hosts are not very secure (even if you're not using Flash/Adobe Reader, are you sure your browser has no issues?) and people carry convenient location and listening devices, commonly known as "mobile phones", with them.
- Egregore 16y ago
  I think the best solution would be the one time certificates. Now there are only limited time certificates. The problem arise in cases when private key of the certificate is compromised.
soult 16y ago
I would just like to point out that Moxie Marlinspike is a hypocrite. Just two years ago he cried foul when an ISP revoked his SSL certificate because he provided falsified (whois) information [1][2], and now he cries foul because ISPs don't do enough to protect against falsified information. 1: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/05/googlesharing_cert_revoked/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/05/googlesharing_cert_r... 2: http://www.gandibar.net/post/2010/04/06/TheRegistercouk-comments-on-gandi-s-removal-of-SSL-certificate-for-googlesharingnet http://www.gandibar.net/post/2010/04/06/TheRegistercouk-comm...

14 points by sasvari 16y ago

The biggest gaping hole ever is that most of the CAs can be pressured by most governments (and perhaps criminal enterprises) into giving out certificates if push came to shove. Pretty much every government has at least one root cert in their control, with which they can MITM each and every site ever. I don't think this aspect really gets the attention it deserves, as all the technical articles remain so technical. Its like not seeing the wood for the trees. My thought is to tie CAs to TLDs. If you want a certificate for a .uk domain, go to one of a select band of CAs for that TLD. And don't get upset when the British government ever does blantantly go snoop. But at least the Russians would have to hack it to do likewise.

JoachimSchipper 16y ago
You identify a real problem, but I'm not sold on your solution. There are lots of British companies on .com; on the other hand, do you really believe the US government wouldn't be able to get certificates for .uk (or, for that matter, .ir)? If nothing else, consider http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ (a rogue CA, based on MD5 collisions) and the declining security of SHA-1... Also, you have to be pretty good at security before using rogue CAs becomes worthwhile. Most hosts are not very secure (even if you're not using Flash/Adobe Reader, are you sure your browser has no issues?) and people carry convenient location and listening devices, commonly known as "mobile phones", with them.
Egregore 16y ago
I think the best solution would be the one time certificates. Now there are only limited time certificates. The problem arise in cases when private key of the certificate is compromised.

soult 16y ago

I would just like to point out that Moxie Marlinspike is a hypocrite. Just two years ago he cried foul when an ISP revoked his SSL certificate because he provided falsified (whois) information [1][2], and now he cries foul because ISPs don't do enough to protect against falsified information. 1: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/05/googlesharing_cert_revoked/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/05/googlesharing_cert_r... 2: http://www.gandibar.net/post/2010/04/06/TheRegistercouk-comments-on-gandi-s-removal-of-SSL-certificate-for-googlesharingnet http://www.gandibar.net/post/2010/04/06/TheRegistercouk-comm...