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> This presumes that in the process you and the clone don't diverge in thought patterns. The brain will change in minor ways throughout your life so during that

> This presumes that in the process you and the clone don't diverge in thought patterns. The brain will change in minor ways throughout your life so during that small window the clone would have minor changes due to its different conditions. This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. We can just add the additional constraint that you and the clone are both in identical operating theatres and your thoughts don't diverge. I don't see that it matters much either way though. > I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. > most people have uploaded their brain and can jump around in bodies due to digital brains being placed into everything between clones and nanobot swarms Star Trek didn't go that far, but it had the 'transporter', which disintegrates you and then synthesises a copy at the other end. It's mentioned in the series that some people refuse to use them for this reason.

ninjanomnom 6y ago
> This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. This is what I was getting at. In the pure thought experiment it's a lot easier to go along with saying that both the pre and post replacement entity is the same person. But people who are ok with that ideal are usually going to be more worried once you involve those real effects that diverge the actual experiment from the thought experiment. If the process takes time then there is time for divergence and that possibility can cause anxiety. If there is no time then it is simply a question of "If you got instantly replaced with an exact duplicate, are you still the same person?" which is meaningless, you would have no possible way of knowing it had happened. You should be more worried about sleep actually being death and the person who wakes up being a different person. >> I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. >But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. Let me rephrase this. Yes the clone suffers and the original wouldn't be aware of it. But I consider both people to be the same person. This is not to mean they are some sort of shared consciousness. Let's imagine you had a clone and an original stuck on an island with supplies to last 4 weeks. You know help will arrive in 8 weeks, so one of you needs to die to allow the other to use the supplies to last that long. If it were me in that scenario I'd just flip a coin and the one who wins gets to survive on the supplies. I consider both as valid as the other to the claim of being me.

ninjanomnom 6y ago

> This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. This is what I was getting at. In the pure thought experiment it's a lot easier to go along with saying that both the pre and post replacement entity is the same person. But people who are ok with that ideal are usually going to be more worried once you involve those real effects that diverge the actual experiment from the thought experiment. If the process takes time then there is time for divergence and that possibility can cause anxiety. If there is no time then it is simply a question of "If you got instantly replaced with an exact duplicate, are you still the same person?" which is meaningless, you would have no possible way of knowing it had happened. You should be more worried about sleep actually being death and the person who wakes up being a different person. >> I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. >But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. Let me rephrase this. Yes the clone suffers and the original wouldn't be aware of it. But I consider both people to be the same person. This is not to mean they are some sort of shared consciousness. Let's imagine you had a clone and an original stuck on an island with supplies to last 4 weeks. You know help will arrive in 8 weeks, so one of you needs to die to allow the other to use the supplies to last that long. If it were me in that scenario I'd just flip a coin and the one who wins gets to survive on the supplies. I consider both as valid as the other to the claim of being me.