3 ms·

> And if it were, it wouldn't be you. That's why I'm a fan of incremental substitution. Replace an individual neuron with an artificial one that duplicates its

by kps 6y ago

> And if it were, it wouldn't be you. That's why I'm a fan of incremental substitution. Replace an individual neuron with an artificial one that duplicates its state and function, but is more mechanically robust. It's clear that doesn't matter to you — individual neurons even die without causing any problem, so an externally-indistinguishable substitute certainly won't. Now do that 100 billion times.

labster 6y ago
The ship of Theseus has already sailed.
bryanrasmussen 6y ago
immediate substitution is just incremental substitution done very, very fast.
- jodrellblank 6y ago
  Exploding is just burning done very very fast, but I'd rather cooked bread than exploded dough. Time matters.
MaxBarraclough 6y ago
I don't think this really holds water. Let's turn it around: we start off with you and a perfect clone of you, except the clone has artificial neurons. Then we gradually swap your neurons with the clone's, without ever interrupting consciousness. Using the logic of your thought-experiment, we should conclude that the 'real you' still resides in your original body, despite that all your neurons now reside in the clone's body. This seems unconvincing. Perhaps the Buddhists have it right and identity of consciousness is illusory, so all such thought-experiments are meaningless.
- jvanderbot 6y ago
  If you believe that the organic neurons hold something other than just their ability to respond to chemical / electrical signals, and that the "you" is something more than just a collection of systems preserving memory and stories, then yes, parent post had a contradiction. I think there's a consensus among those commenting here that "you" are nothing more than the stories and information exchange stored in your connectome, and so replacing the individual neurons with exact copies will have no effect on the information-preserving role the mind plays, and the information-processing role the "thinking mind" plays.
- ninjanomnom 6y ago
  This presumes that in the process you and the clone don't diverge in thought patterns. The brain will change in minor ways throughout your life so during that small window the clone would have minor changes due to its different conditions. Gradual replacement allows for you to be conscious during the whole process with potentially some time between each replacement to adjust. Personally however I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. If my brain were absolutely perfectly replaced in an instant of zero time then yes, I would consider that to still be me. There's a great tabletop rpg that goes into this called eclipse phase. In it most people have uploaded their brain and can jump around in bodies due to digital brains being placed into everything between clones and nanobot swarms. This also allows them to make copies of their mind at will to do tasks and merge back together. I'm definitely a transhumanist because I would love to have such technology and would be happy calling all those copies just as valid as the original.
  - MaxBarraclough 6y ago
    > This presumes that in the process you and the clone don't diverge in thought patterns. The brain will change in minor ways throughout your life so during that small window the clone would have minor changes due to its different conditions. This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. We can just add the additional constraint that you and the clone are both in identical operating theatres and your thoughts don't diverge. I don't see that it matters much either way though. > I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. > most people have uploaded their brain and can jump around in bodies due to digital brains being placed into everything between clones and nanobot swarms Star Trek didn't go that far, but it had the 'transporter', which disintegrates you and then synthesises a copy at the other end. It's mentioned in the series that some people refuse to use them for this reason.
    - ninjanomnom 6y ago
      > This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. This is what I was getting at. In the pure thought experiment it's a lot easier to go along with saying that both the pre and post replacement entity is the same person. But people who are ok with that ideal are usually going to be more worried once you involve those real effects that diverge the actual experiment from the thought experiment. If the process takes time then there is time for divergence and that possibility can cause anxiety. If there is no time then it is simply a question of "If you got instantly replaced with an exact duplicate, are you still the same person?" which is meaningless, you would have no possible way of knowing it had happened. You should be more worried about sleep actually being death and the person who wakes up being a different person. >> I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. >But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. Let me rephrase this. Yes the clone suffers and the original wouldn't be aware of it. But I consider both people to be the same person. This is not to mean they are some sort of shared consciousness. Let's imagine you had a clone and an original stuck on an island with supplies to last 4 weeks. You know help will arrive in 8 weeks, so one of you needs to die to allow the other to use the supplies to last that long. If it were me in that scenario I'd just flip a coin and the one who wins gets to survive on the supplies. I consider both as valid as the other to the claim of being me.

by kps 6y ago

labster 6y ago

The ship of Theseus has already sailed.

bryanrasmussen 6y ago

immediate substitution is just incremental substitution done very, very fast.

jodrellblank 6y ago
Exploding is just burning done very very fast, but I'd rather cooked bread than exploded dough. Time matters.

MaxBarraclough 6y ago

I don't think this really holds water. Let's turn it around: we start off with you and a perfect clone of you, except the clone has artificial neurons. Then we gradually swap your neurons with the clone's, without ever interrupting consciousness. Using the logic of your thought-experiment, we should conclude that the 'real you' still resides in your original body, despite that all your neurons now reside in the clone's body. This seems unconvincing. Perhaps the Buddhists have it right and identity of consciousness is illusory, so all such thought-experiments are meaningless.

jvanderbot 6y ago
If you believe that the organic neurons hold something other than just their ability to respond to chemical / electrical signals, and that the "you" is something more than just a collection of systems preserving memory and stories, then yes, parent post had a contradiction. I think there's a consensus among those commenting here that "you" are nothing more than the stories and information exchange stored in your connectome, and so replacing the individual neurons with exact copies will have no effect on the information-preserving role the mind plays, and the information-processing role the "thinking mind" plays.
ninjanomnom 6y ago
This presumes that in the process you and the clone don't diverge in thought patterns. The brain will change in minor ways throughout your life so during that small window the clone would have minor changes due to its different conditions. Gradual replacement allows for you to be conscious during the whole process with potentially some time between each replacement to adjust. Personally however I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. If my brain were absolutely perfectly replaced in an instant of zero time then yes, I would consider that to still be me. There's a great tabletop rpg that goes into this called eclipse phase. In it most people have uploaded their brain and can jump around in bodies due to digital brains being placed into everything between clones and nanobot swarms. This also allows them to make copies of their mind at will to do tasks and merge back together. I'm definitely a transhumanist because I would love to have such technology and would be happy calling all those copies just as valid as the original.
- MaxBarraclough 6y ago
  > This presumes that in the process you and the clone don't diverge in thought patterns. The brain will change in minor ways throughout your life so during that small window the clone would have minor changes due to its different conditions. This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. We can just add the additional constraint that you and the clone are both in identical operating theatres and your thoughts don't diverge. I don't see that it matters much either way though. > I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. > most people have uploaded their brain and can jump around in bodies due to digital brains being placed into everything between clones and nanobot swarms Star Trek didn't go that far, but it had the 'transporter', which disintegrates you and then synthesises a copy at the other end. It's mentioned in the series that some people refuse to use them for this reason.
  - ninjanomnom 6y ago
    > This is true as a practical matter, but it doesn't have much bearing on the thought-experiment. This is what I was getting at. In the pure thought experiment it's a lot easier to go along with saying that both the pre and post replacement entity is the same person. But people who are ok with that ideal are usually going to be more worried once you involve those real effects that diverge the actual experiment from the thought experiment. If the process takes time then there is time for divergence and that possibility can cause anxiety. If there is no time then it is simply a question of "If you got instantly replaced with an exact duplicate, are you still the same person?" which is meaningless, you would have no possible way of knowing it had happened. You should be more worried about sleep actually being death and the person who wakes up being a different person. >> I would view a perfect clone of me to be the same as me. >But it isn't. If it suffers, you do not. You might not even be aware of its existence. Let me rephrase this. Yes the clone suffers and the original wouldn't be aware of it. But I consider both people to be the same person. This is not to mean they are some sort of shared consciousness. Let's imagine you had a clone and an original stuck on an island with supplies to last 4 weeks. You know help will arrive in 8 weeks, so one of you needs to die to allow the other to use the supplies to last that long. If it were me in that scenario I'd just flip a coin and the one who wins gets to survive on the supplies. I consider both as valid as the other to the claim of being me.