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And if it were, it wouldn't be you. But it might be enough like you that it could convince your bank to give it your money.
by ncmncm 6y ago
And if it were, it wouldn't be you.
But it might be enough like you that it could convince your bank to give it your money.
- wizzwizz4 6y agoNow, that's an interesting philosophical question. The early ones (where “early” is perhaps around the 2200s), probably not – but are you still “you” after heavy brain damage? Why would a bad copy and unfaithful simulation be much different?
- Retric 6y agoBecause philosophy focuses on artifacts of language over reality.
- wizzwizz4 6y agoPhilosophers, perhaps, but I maintain that philosophy is genuinely useful. (Just not philosophising about epistemically solved problems.)
- Retric 6y agoHah, that’s perfect. After all why would philosophy be what philosophers did.
- wizzwizz4 6y agoIt used to be, and some philosophers still do. But, increasingly, philosophy actually requires knowing things about the world – you need to have at least a basic understanding of what's been experimentally verified if you want to just sit around thinking about how you'd design the universe – at least, if you want to have any success, like Einstein did.
- Jtsummers 6y agoGreg Egan's short story collection Axiomatic has some stories dealing with the issue of identity after upload. It probably comes up in some of his other stories as well, but that's all I've read so far of his works.
- teekert 6y agoI like permutation city from Egan, for some more nice thoughts on the matter.
- RobertoG 6y ago"Permutation city" is like the sacred book of uploading, in my opinion.
- hesdeadjim 6y agoAbsolutely, one of my favorite novels of all time.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- stallmanite 6y agoChiming in to join the chorus of praise for Permutation City and also call attention to Egan’s technical notes / FAQ for the same. Really mind-bending reading https://www.gregegan.net/PERMUTATION/FAQ/FAQ.html https://www.gregegan.net/PERMUTATION/FAQ/FAQ.html
- m4rtink 6y agoEven if you yourself did not do that, if others did it would be good for you - say a friend gets a backup and then has an incident. A friend restored from a backup is better than a dead friend.
- aeternum 6y agoYes, the concept of 'you' is much more fluid than people realize. Every time you recall a memory you slightly alter it. Is the real 'you' the you of today or of a month ago?
- renewiltord 6y agoPersonal immortality isn't the goal. I believe my thought patterns are conducive to long-term human or post-human species success. I have chosen (or have had chosen for me by biology) as an axiom that this is desirable. I can create copies enhanced by partner genetics and trained by me who have the ability to fit themselves to circumstances I cannot foresee. My personal death is required for evolution, and permits washing out overfitting to local conditions. The brain upload isn't for power or personal immortality. It is for the thought patterns of the time to be accessible as a library or intelligent servant so that later generations may prosper. If I am fortunate, I will be so preserved, and they will overrule me most of the time, using me the way I use (say) Karl Popper's books: as a reference, not as immutable truth, and not as the sole tool to make decisions. My mind is far more general purpose than a book, so it will be tempting for them to treat it as a sole tool, but I'm counting on them being smarter than me. And if they deem me, Gen 1 uploadee, only worthy of jokes like we see Alicebot, so be it. If I am to be deleted as I am superseded, so be it.
- anticensor 6y agoI have an even better idea: Cloning a female in her own womb, using her body cells as a base.
- bena 6y agoThat's clever, but how do we account for replication errors? Wouldn't it be better to infuse the host with DNA from another of the same species? Sure, you wouldn't get perfect clones, but this also opens us up to the possibility of combining desirable traits from multiple people.
- anticensor 6y agoThat method would be useful to produce the master copy.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
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- Analemma_ 6y agoThere is no argument you can make that "an uploaded mind isn't you" which doesn't apply equally well to what happens when someone goes to sleep at night and wakes up the next morning. And somehow we don't worry about that.
- jodrellblank 6y agoSleep isn't death, or a pause button; exter-conscious brain activity is still you. Sleeping doesn't generate petabytes of data elsewhere in space. Sleeping doesn't have a mechanical "scanning" process which takes time to read across a brain. Sleeping doesn't have a mechanical scanning process with measurement errors, approximations and simplifications. Sleeping doesn't abruptly disconnect trillions of body cells. Uploading doesn't use biology or Penrose and Hameroff's microtubules. Uploading doesn't have a physical embodiement. Uploading runs a simulation. Uploading is a different place in space with a wildly different configuration of matter and energy. Consciousness has not been proven to be a) purely information processing or b) possible on an electronic Von Neumann state machine. (I'm not saying it isn't, I'm saying "of course it is, what else could it be?" isn't proof - especially when a popular part of uploading arguments is the ability to simulate arbitrary things or fake parts of the experience to the point where you won't notice anything is wrong; taking a position where simulations can be OK because we can do that to make them be OK, but that can't be happening right now because nothing seems wrong, is weird). You don't have to believe in a soul, quantum woo, or human exceptionalism to observe that part of the universe doing something and part of the universe doing something which looks to humans like doing something else, are different.
- kps 6y ago> And if it were, it wouldn't be you. That's why I'm a fan of incremental substitution. Replace an individual neuron with an artificial one that duplicates its state and function, but is more mechanically robust. It's clear that doesn't matter to you — individual neurons even die without causing any problem, so an externally-indistinguishable substitute certainly won't. Now do that 100 billion times.
- labster 6y agoThe ship of Theseus has already sailed.
- bryanrasmussen 6y agoimmediate substitution is just incremental substitution done very, very fast.
- jodrellblank 6y agoExploding is just burning done very very fast, but I'd rather cooked bread than exploded dough. Time matters.
- MaxBarraclough 6y agoI don't think this really holds water. Let's turn it around: we start off with you and a perfect clone of you, except the clone has artificial neurons. Then we gradually swap your neurons with the clone's, without ever interrupting consciousness. Using the logic of your thought-experiment, we should conclude that the 'real you' still resides in your original body, despite that all your neurons now reside in the clone's body. This seems unconvincing. Perhaps the Buddhists have it right and identity of consciousness is illusory, so all such thought-experiments are meaningless.
- jvanderbot 6y agoIf you believe that the organic neurons hold something other than just their ability to respond to chemical / electrical signals, and that the "you" is something more than just a collection of systems preserving memory and stories, then yes, parent post had a contradiction. I think there's a consensus among those commenting here that "you" are nothing more than the stories and information exchange stored in your connectome, and so replacing the individual neurons with exact copies will have no effect on the information-preserving role the mind plays, and the information-processing role the "thinking mind" plays.
- adrianmonk 6y agoThere's a Star Trek novel (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spock_Must_Die! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spock_Must_Die!) where IIRC they explore how the transporter is sort of destroying the original you and recreating a new one somewhere else. It's a legit philosophical question, but practically speaking, the people who use the transporter don't feel like they're longer themselves. They just feel like they've moved. That's fiction, of course, but what the characters experience is what I'd expect to happen in real life if a transporter did exist. If a structure (human) is destroyed and recreated identically at some other location, I don't see why that should be any different than moving the atoms over while preserving the structure. And I don't see why things would be different if you created the same structure (or an isomorphic one) inside a computer. Of course, I'm assuming that what makes you you is simply the structure and how it operates as a system. That's definitely a philosophical question, but I think if its answer is what I expect, then a perfect recreation of you is you. And yes, this raises the question of whether there can be more than one of you. (Which I think the Star Trek novel also covers.) I don't think this cloning presents a philosophical barrier, though. I think it's similar to calling fork(). The only observable differences come from the kernel intervening to change the pid and fork()'s return value. There's nothing fundamentally unsound about the idea of splitting into two and both being "you". Although there are definitely things that are unsettling about it.
- pmoriarty 6y ago"the people who use the transporter don't feel like they're longer themselves. They just feel like they've moved." Well, the people going in the transporter would be killed, so they wouldn't be feeling anything after that. The people coming out of the transporter might feel like they just appeared in a new place, but that is immaterial to the people who were killed by the transporter. Similarly, a mother could have grounds for rejecting a teleported child, for the one who came out of the teleporter was not physically the one she gave birth to. Incidentally, the philosophical concept that episode explores goes back long, long before Star Trek, to the Ship of Theseus[1] thought experiment from Ancient Greece (and I wouldn't be surprised if this was considered even before then in ancient India or China). The Ship of Theseus problem asks: if a ship's parts are progressively replaced with new parts, until all the parts have been replaced, is it still the same ship? The cells in our bodies are being progressively replaced. A materialist, naturalist, or physicalist would have trouble explaining how someone could retain their original identity if nothing of them was left after this process. The brain upload, teleporter, and transporter questions are variations on these. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
- nick_kline 6y agoGreat point, need to consider that in my will. Every mini me can have 5% of my estate, up to 60% of my estate being consumed.
- jodrellblank 6y agoOne clone of you claims your entire estate, with the quite convincing argument that it is you and the estate belongs entirely to it, and your will has no power since wills only matter after the owner is dead, and it is clearly alive.
- InfiniteRand 6y agoSo here’s my best bet of how you could make a digital upload actually be you. Say you could do a full biology simulation, and you use that to essentially extend your brain like extra layers of computation. Then you slowly turn off parts of your original brain while adding more chunks of functionality, until all of the original brain is gone. This would be you in the sense that there is a continuous chain of being between your original self and your digital self (counting sleeping and maybe coma as still part of that chain of being) Of course if this was enough to designate you still being you, it would throw into question if you stop your heart and then restart it, are you still you? (Probably the nature of stopping hearts is more complicated than I think it is, so I am not 100% sure this is a valid objection)
- patagurbon 6y agoThe real question for me, is as an observer how do I know that this process maintains the same conscious individual. It's perfectly plausible that this works, but I have no way to know that if I undergo that process I will survive rather than just be replaced.
- jeremysalwen 6y agoIt's easy, because the process happens gradually. If you ever feel yourself losing control of your mind, you could say something!
- weregiraffe 6y ago>And if it were, it wouldn't be you. You don't know it (pun intended). There is, in fact, no definition of what "you" even is. It's called a "hard problem of consciousness" for a reason.
- ncmncm 6y agoHard for some people, evidently. But if you were standing next to a machine you had "uploaded" to, and I was asked to identify which was really you, I would have no slightest doubt. And, really, neither would you.
- treesprite82 6y ago> And, really, neither would you Which me are you asking? The meatbag and the machine would both claim to be me, and both would have some merit to that claim by having the same memories, same personality, etc. After the uploading they'd start to go separate ways and develop their own exclusive memories. Initially the meatbag would probably be closest to current-as-I-am-writing-this-me, if that means anything, but the machine could take that title when the meatbag develops alzheimers or passes away.
- ncmncm 6y ago> "Which me are you asking?" You, of course.
- treesprite82 6y agoWhich one? The concept of a singular "me" starts to break down in situations with clones. Both would claim to be me, and I think both would be right. You're trying to force a certain conclusion by only asking one of them and by limiting there to only being one "real me".
- jvanderbot 6y agoOr, to convince everyone you were preserved. If it murdered you, nobody would care / notice! Like the teleporters in star trek.