> The main point is not that Apple is a monopoly on the smartphone market, the issue is the monopoly Apple has on distributing apps for the iOS platform. The q

> The main point is not that Apple is a monopoly on the smartphone market, the issue is the monopoly Apple has on distributing apps for the iOS platform. The question of whether the iOS app distribution market is, in fact, separate and valid antitrust market is not something that can simply be assumed. This is known as a "wholly derivative aftermarket" (as the market for iOS apps would not exist independently of the market for iPhones), and US courts generally disallow antitrust aftermarkets to be defined in the context of a single brand's product unless specific criteria are met. [1] One of the key criteria is whether or not the consumer knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the aftermarket restriction when they made their initial purchase. If they knew about the aftermarket restriction and could have bought an alternate product without such restrictions, but went ahead and bought the restricted product anyway, then the market power deriving from that restriction is not considered a valid basis for an antitrust claim. In other words, if when consumers bought an iPhone, they knew they would be limited to installing apps from the App Store, and they went ahead and bought the iPhone anyway, it is rather unlikely that a US court would consider the "monopoly Apple has on distributing apps for the iOS platform" to be a valid antitrust market. [1] The criteria are explained in Newcal Industries, Inc. v. IKON Office Solution (https://casetext.com/case/newcal-industries-v-ikon-office-solution https://casetext.com/case/newcal-industries-v-ikon-office-so...). Most of the cases where single-brand aftermarkets were permitted by the court involve situations where the consumer did not know about the restriction at the time of purchase, because the company changed a policy or modified existing agreements after the purchase.