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"Please chill out with the attacks" I'm not attacking you, just the concept. The goal is not to hurt you, but to protect others. Please don't take it personall
by maqp 6y ago
"Please chill out with the attacks"
I'm not attacking you, just the concept. The goal is not to hurt you, but to protect others. Please don't take it personally!
"What is TCB?"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base
"One set of threats this protects agains is any for which people would use Signal for: encrypted security."
Well, yes, confidentiality is the desired property of encrypted messengers.
"Also consider the threat in case a Messenger is compelled by the its local government to leak keys on the client (say through an app update) or server by warrant"
I'm not sure what the EARN IT / LAED bill's status is, but for now what holds is US vs Bernstein that established code as speech, and thus protected with 1st amendment, which includes backdoors (effectively compelled speech, also protected under the 1st). Also, Signal has pledged to move abroad if the bills pass. Given that the clients are reproducible and FOSS, I'm going to take any claim that the US government can just force a die-hard cypherpunk like Moxie to add a backdoor and keep that quiet with all his contacts at the ACLU and thee EFF, with a truck-load of salt.
"rogue employee at Messenger company who compromises."
The git tree is a rather permanent log for who merges a backdoor into the code. Also, there's most likely some form of code review especially wrt security critical code.
"Often a high security environment will compile its own version of Signal's open source client"
Citation needed.
Also, why wouldn't the independently compiled client also update itself automatically via Signal's servers? It's not like the APK version (https://signal.org/android/apk/ https://signal.org/android/apk/) doesn't also update itself.
"Horcruxes would allow the high security user to send 1 horcrux on the custom compiled Signal version, and another horcrux on the public app store version"
The thing is, Signal can only be compromised by hacking the endpoint, as can Horcrux. If you're relying on the secrecy of the CT delivery mechanisms, you're essentially attempting security through obscurity that only adds log2(n) bits of security where n is the number of possible delivery paths.
- ljlolel 6y agoI think you're still missing many points of this. The idea of trust Signal no matter what is funny though.
- maqp 6y agoThere's other stuff protecting you when it comes to Signal: FOSS code, professional audits, reproducible builds etc. If you can't trust networked TCB there's not much you can do anyway. Adding one or more networked TCBs that also need to be compromised isn't going to turn into anything magical. It's about the architecture, and if you need architecture of "no sensitive key/pt material on networked device(s)", you're out of options quite fast. It's either airgaps (shown to be weak as I linked the IEEE etc. articles above), or split TCBs (AFAIK my research on that is the only public work available).