> Heh, that's funny, the documented threat model was looking at observing text, not changing it. It doesn't really matter what your threat model is if people s

> Heh, that's funny, the documented threat model was looking at observing text, not changing it. It doesn't really matter what your threat model is if people see "encrypted messaging" and think it's to secure chat messages.... Putting an asterisk somewhere that indicates you exclude the single biggest source of issues for an encryption scheme is like throwing a brick through Sony's window with the text on it "BY ACCEPTING THIS BRICK THROUGH YOUR WINDOW, YOU ACCEPT IT AS IS AND AGREE TO MY DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS WELL AS DISCLAIMERS OF ALL LIABILITY, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL, THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF THIS BRICK INTO YOUR BUILDING." (http://bash.org/?577451 http://bash.org/?577451) Anyhow, defending a broken scheme rather than just honestly saying "I had not considered that; I'll introduce X to fix this issue." also kind of breaks any credibility down for me.