"Hyperbolic claims aside†, I think this is a practical way to dramatically increase the security of OTP key transmission over networked communication." I get y

"Hyperbolic claims aside†, I think this is a practical way to dramatically increase the security of OTP key transmission over networked communication." I get you, you're thinking, it's safe as long as one of the channels is not tapped by the same entity. But the problem is this: You're relying on the assumption at least one of the channels is safe. The point of public key cryptography is to protect communication even if none of them are safe. The best the adversary can do in those scenarios is MITM attack, which can be detected over an authenticated channel. "It's not perfect, but it would make any attacker's job harder, right?" It's much easier and cheaper to hack WeChat's non-E2EE messaging app service to steal the OTP keys that decrypt the messages, than it is to break e.g. Curve25519. "That's a chicken and egg problem for the attacker." It's not. All the attacker needs to do is look at the metadata like TCP headers, to see what servers the device talks to. Also note that the author does not propose any remedy to this problem, especially not a single mention of Tor. "The information on exactly where and what the other horcruxes are could be residing entirely elsewhere in a very encrypted way, or even discussed in person." It's a bit much to assume peers are willing to play secret agent, perform periodic rendezvous to exchange OTP material etc. Also, the problem with SSS is, pieces are created on demand, in that sense using multiple OTPs is better. "Aren't the mechanisms to transmit OTP keys -- prone to weaker security than the OTP mechanism itself?" Yes, practically always. The only way to do it more securely is in via sneakernet, in person. This would apply even if you'd do quantum key distribution (e.g. the BB84 requires the Carter-Wegman MAC's key to be pre-shared to authenticate transmission's basis and thus that no OTP interception took place). And that's not something you want to keep doing, thus PSKs are much more usable and thus more secure a choice.