4 ms·

> Proof of Concept Heh, that's funny, the documented threat model was looking at observing text, not changing it. I haven't heard about anybody making things t

> Proof of Concept Heh, that's funny, the documented threat model was looking at observing text, not changing it. I haven't heard about anybody making things tamper-proof from a government that has got your keys. With Signal, of course if NSA got your keys by force, can do the same thing, just on a single client. So there isn't any less security than Signal. Finally, if you have 3, 4, 5, horcruxes, then they would still all need to cooperate to get the messages in order to do this perfect XOR (and remember they need to hack through the E2EE on each service too).

lucb1e 6y ago
> Heh, that's funny, the documented threat model was looking at observing text, not changing it. It doesn't really matter what your threat model is if people see "encrypted messaging" and think it's to secure chat messages.... Putting an asterisk somewhere that indicates you exclude the single biggest source of issues for an encryption scheme is like throwing a brick through Sony's window with the text on it "BY ACCEPTING THIS BRICK THROUGH YOUR WINDOW, YOU ACCEPT IT AS IS AND AGREE TO MY DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS WELL AS DISCLAIMERS OF ALL LIABILITY, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL, THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF THIS BRICK INTO YOUR BUILDING." (http://bash.org/?577451 http://bash.org/?577451) Anyhow, defending a broken scheme rather than just honestly saying "I had not considered that; I'll introduce X to fix this issue." also kind of breaks any credibility down for me.
- ljlolel 6y ago
  Chill out a bit... Like I said, Signal (and everything else) has the same exact vulnerability, it must since I'd be sending over Signal. And if it doesn't, then this attack wouldn't be possible.... The whole point of using these existing schemes is to inherit at least the security properties of those channels, and then augmenting them and mitigating some threats.
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lucb1e 6y ago

> Heh, that's funny, the documented threat model was looking at observing text, not changing it. It doesn't really matter what your threat model is if people see "encrypted messaging" and think it's to secure chat messages.... Putting an asterisk somewhere that indicates you exclude the single biggest source of issues for an encryption scheme is like throwing a brick through Sony's window with the text on it "BY ACCEPTING THIS BRICK THROUGH YOUR WINDOW, YOU ACCEPT IT AS IS AND AGREE TO MY DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS WELL AS DISCLAIMERS OF ALL LIABILITY, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL, THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF THIS BRICK INTO YOUR BUILDING." (http://bash.org/?577451 http://bash.org/?577451) Anyhow, defending a broken scheme rather than just honestly saying "I had not considered that; I'll introduce X to fix this issue." also kind of breaks any credibility down for me.

ljlolel 6y ago
Chill out a bit... Like I said, Signal (and everything else) has the same exact vulnerability, it must since I'd be sending over Signal. And if it doesn't, then this attack wouldn't be possible.... The whole point of using these existing schemes is to inherit at least the security properties of those channels, and then augmenting them and mitigating some threats.

deleted 6y ago

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