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Horcruxes are just a layer of security. Sure, but the problem it solves is not the problem that needs addressing. Ciphertext and key delivery can already be do
by maqp 6y ago
Horcruxes are just a layer of security.
Sure, but the problem it solves is not the problem that needs addressing. Ciphertext and key delivery can already be done safely with E2EE apps like Signal. Metadata can be eliminated with e.g. Tor Onion Services.
Your apps relies on QR-codes to exchange data, the same channel can be used to authenticate Signal endpoints and/or exchange PSKs, no need for SSS. Goal for information theoretic security is fine but considering nobody is doing CT-only attacks against modern algorithms anyway, the easiest attack vector will be MITM attack or remote key exfiltration. E.g. Snowden has been very vocal in the past about NSAs of the world hacking endpoints, but has quieted a bit down wrt the matter, perhaps he realized that was too high bar for average users who still benefit from incremental security from Signal etc.
- ljlolel 6y agoPleas read through the whole doc. In many places it describes how it increases the cost of device hacking using 0-days significantly. There are limited other solutions for this, whereas Horcruxes are cheap and easy to implement.
- maqp 6y agoThe thing is, for the Horcrux to have any effect at all you need at least three devices per endpoint. And at that point using split TCB architecture is much better as under some assumptions it's provably secure against remote key exfiltration. See my work on TFC here: https://github.com/maqp/tfc https://github.com/maqp/tfc