4 ms·
> The encryption can be broken in the future if the rival states become allies, or otherwise become willing to share data with each other. Witty, sure, but I w
by johnisgood 6y ago
> The encryption can be broken in the future if the rival states become allies, or otherwise become willing to share data with each other.
Witty, sure, but I would not trust it with sensitive data at all if it is relying on political relations ("politics") only.
> Many [vulnerabilities] in Whatsapp/Telegram/Signal
Please provide citations for currently known vulnerabilities of each of these, then.
Telegram does not even support "secret chat" (E2EE) on their desktop and web version of the software[1]. No need for vulnerabilities here.
[1] https://tsf.telegram.org/manuals/e2ee-simple https://tsf.telegram.org/manuals/e2ee-simple
- ljlolel 6y agoHorcruxes are just a layer of security. If you want to further encrypt (or do more steganography) on the messages then it is not hard to add that too depending on your threat model and paranoia level. Horcruxes provide a unique solution to the problem of dragnets and increase costs of hacking your device even for governments.
- maqp 6y agoHorcruxes are just a layer of security. Sure, but the problem it solves is not the problem that needs addressing. Ciphertext and key delivery can already be done safely with E2EE apps like Signal. Metadata can be eliminated with e.g. Tor Onion Services. Your apps relies on QR-codes to exchange data, the same channel can be used to authenticate Signal endpoints and/or exchange PSKs, no need for SSS. Goal for information theoretic security is fine but considering nobody is doing CT-only attacks against modern algorithms anyway, the easiest attack vector will be MITM attack or remote key exfiltration. E.g. Snowden has been very vocal in the past about NSAs of the world hacking endpoints, but has quieted a bit down wrt the matter, perhaps he realized that was too high bar for average users who still benefit from incremental security from Signal etc.
- ljlolel 6y agoPleas read through the whole doc. In many places it describes how it increases the cost of device hacking using 0-days significantly. There are limited other solutions for this, whereas Horcruxes are cheap and easy to implement.
- maqp 6y agoThe thing is, for the Horcrux to have any effect at all you need at least three devices per endpoint. And at that point using split TCB architecture is much better as under some assumptions it's provably secure against remote key exfiltration. See my work on TFC here: https://github.com/maqp/tfc https://github.com/maqp/tfc
- vii 6y agoThe idea of layering security is very powerful, acknowledged in this "Network Operations Division Cryptographic Requirements" document https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/NOD%20Cryptographic%20Requirements%20v1.1%20TOP%20SECRET.pdf https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/files/NOD%20Cryptographic%... > Certificate validation must not be performed against any standard SSL root CAs. > implement an inner cryptostream within the SSL tunnel transfer People often state that you should not roll your own crypto. Definitely, you look foolish for making a mistake doing your own thing. However, adding your own layer on top of a standard one seems safe and likely to slow an adversary down considerably. Adding a layer below to encrypt data before the standard algorithm gets it has some risks (e.g. could leak in some complex way like a timing attack) but it also protects against a compromise in the implementation of the standard algorithm. Adding the Horcrux layer of multiple channels does seem to increase security at the cost of creating a new unvalidated magic wand that then becomes the attack surface - and another significant cost in that it is not user friendly and involves considerable effort per message. There are ways of implementing greater security at high cost, e.g. point-to-point communications off network. The question is if the extra effort confers any benefit. Sometimes just the fact that two parties are communicating is valuable knowledge and this Horcrux mechanism actually makes that easier to detect as it occurs across multiple systems.
- ljlolel 6y agoAll good points, agreed with all. > Sometimes just the fact that two parties are communicating is valuable knowledge and this Horcrux mechanism actually makes that easier to detect as it occurs across multiple systems. Steganography can alleviate that red flag.
- ljlolel 6y ago> Please provide citations for currently known vulnerabilities of each of these, then. They have had 0-days before, and they will have 0-days in the future. Jeff Bezos was hacked by Saudi Arabia using a WhatsApp 0-day. It's a property of complex software. Companies in Israel and elsewhere are paid millions to find these 0-days.
- maqp 6y agoThe problem is the magic wand is a single endpoint which will also have 0-days now, and in the future. Since the endpoint is connected to the network (at least you don't talk about airgaps in your work), there's a bidirectional malware insertion and plaintext exfiltration channel. I don't see how this solves anything.
- nepthar 6y agoI believe the author suggested QR codes as an air gap method
- ljlolel 6y agoPlease read through the document. It clearly states in the Magic Wand section that it would be separate HW not with any wireless or wired connections including WiFi or BlueTooth.
- maqp 6y agoIn retrospect I should have read it first, I just ran a quick search on standard lingo i.e. "air gap", to see if that was the case, and I assumed it wasn't when the search yielded no results.
- xphos 6y agoI don't know the wand just aggregates the data in an offline setting, pretty hard to zero day that. Because even if you did it cant transmit the data out as its an offline device. I don't know how practical that is or if people would obey merging the data offline but if they follow the system the author has a point. Note the system totally fails and is zero day-able if you have all of the data streams merged on a non magic wand device. The separation of data seems really important to the system as a whole.