3 ms·
Back over ten years ago when my bank first supported 2FA via SMS, SS7 attacks were something for professionals/nation states only. These days it's commoditized,
by mschuster91 6y ago
Back over ten years ago when my bank first supported 2FA via SMS, SS7 attacks were something for professionals/nation states only. These days it's commoditized, that is what changed.
- asdff 6y agoWhat about just plain old social engineering? Get a hold of someones phone, and that 2 factor authentication becomes 1 factor. This sort of thing is not that hard in a world where college students routinely leave all their crap out in the library. Duo and all the other 2 factor methods are such jokes. I worked in a hospital that used duo for everything from logging into your workstation to accessing the intranet. Many people had duo set to call their office phone 6 inches from their computer. All someone would have to do is sit down in that desk for 10 minutes, lift the handset and press '1,' and have a field day on protected patient data.
- mindslight 6y agoThis sounds akin to the handwaving of "that exploit is only hypothetical" that necessitated full disclosure. The eventual democratization of SS7-based attacks was entirely foreseeable. If I were to use plaintext http to access a bank website today, I would be reasonably confident that there would be no immediate problem. But given a year or two of this practice being normalized, the market would find ways to infiltrate consumer ISPs, the bank's upstream, hijack routing prefixes and DNS, etc. And what are text messages but a similar non-e2e protocol? The chief difficulty seems to be that telco standards are hidden away and obscured by horrible complexity, rather than being published as straightforward RFCs.
- trasz 6y agoTen years ago I was working in that industry and it was already known the attacks are plausible even for not particularly resourceful attackers, because it’s already been done.