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> So-called "Binary Transparency" may eventually allow users to verify that a program they've been delivered is one that's available to the public, and not a sp

> So-called "Binary Transparency" may eventually allow users to verify that a program they've been delivered is one that's available to the public, and not a specially-built version intended to attack just them. Binary transparency systems don't exist yet, but they're likely to work similarly to the successful Certificate Transparency logs via https://wicg.github.io/webpackage/draft-yasskin-http-origin-signed-responses.html#uc-transparency https://wicg.github.io/webpackage/draft-yasskin-http-origin-... We are building a binary transparency system here: https://transparencylog.com https://transparencylog.com Having HTTP signed requests would be nice to prove that the origin server presented the contents.

tialaramex 6y ago
The circumstances that enabled Certificate Transparency to succeed were pretty narrow, but people seem to keep proposing more of these X Transparency systems so maybe I should actually properly write down why I think that's largely futile, not because I expect it will stop anyone but because at least then I can just paste the link. For now, let me highlight a really big consideration: - Most of the effectiveness of CT logs stems from the logging mandate not the cryptography. The publicly trusted CAs proactively log either everything they issue or all but some relatively small controlled subset of issued certificates which purposefully fall outside the mandate. Will your X transparency be mandatory? Who will enforce that? Won't it be more practical to reject systems that try to mandate X transparency than to implement it?