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Is there a use-case where this functionality is useful and non-malicious? It seems that the protection against this attack is being able to recognize that the
by Spivak 6y ago
Is there a use-case where this functionality is useful and non-malicious?
It seems that the protection against this attack is being able to recognize that the file that's attached isn't the one that's intended but I think it's a mistake for the local filename and any fs metadata to be preserved when sharing by default. Sharing a file should mean sharing only the content of the that file.
- kevincox 6y agoI don't think there is a valid use case. It seems like they just weren't validating the resource well enough. Reminds me of the somewhat recent mailto:?attachment=/etc/password bug reappearance https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xdg/xdg-utils/-/issues/177 https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xdg/xdg-utils/-/issues/177