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You can sign the code on your own computer (which might even be offline) before deploying on some other company's server. So, it's harder for an attacker to ge
by skybrian 6y ago
You can sign the code on your own computer (which might even be offline) before deploying on some other company's server.
So, it's harder for an attacker to get their code signed using your certificate. Hacking into the website would be useless; they'd have to get the code into the development environment.
Or to put it another way, an HTTPS server automatically signs any file that it serves. That's too easy.
- kevingadd 6y ago"an HTTPS server automatically signs any file that it serves" is a perfect way to put it. When it comes to getting access to code signing certificates, in many cases the state of the art is to have the signing certificate escrowed so aggressively that the only way to sign a binary is for it to go through a full build pipeline, because the central build servers are the only thing with access to the certificate. That significantly reduces the risk of someone managing to get your signing certificate and sign malware, which means you can focus on other vulnerabilities in your pipeline like your revision control server or your library dependencies.
- modeless 6y agoYou could achieve this with HTTPS and Signed Exchanges. https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/11/signed-exchanges https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/11/signed-exc...
- kevingadd 6y agoMy understanding is Signed Exchanges only solve "I want to allow another server to handle requests for my HTTPS server" and not "I want to guarantee the integrity of content coming from my HTTPS server". Did they expand the spec to somehow address the latter?
- modeless 6y agoYou could obtain an HTTPS certificate and then only use it for offline signing. That would fulfill the same purpose.