"- if you receive a stream of unencrypted postcards from Grandma on vacation" That's such a bullshit excuse. Everything goes with outer layer of encryption the

"- if you receive a stream of unencrypted postcards from Grandma on vacation" That's such a bullshit excuse. Everything goes with outer layer of encryption these days, what matters is will Telegram offer to lock themselves out of the messages to which the answer is no by default. If you want to chat on desktop or create a group, the answer is no whether you like it or not. So again, some niché use case of "it's probably nothing sensitive so you might as well send it in the clear because that says you're not a dissident" is thus not even valid. There's almost always outer layer of encryption. "The availability of metadata, who can access that metadata etc etc plays a role." Indeed. All the more reason to avoid Telegram that by default stores all that metadata. "someone always have to pull the E2E: Good, anything else: Bad." No the point is we'll never even get to the debate on reducing metadata as long as we need to play whack-a-mole with shit apps like Telegram that don't E2EE by default, let alone provide any kind of metadata protection, even sealed sender like Signal does. As the author of messaging system[1] that provides both E2EE by default for everything as well as metadata protection (more than any other app out there) and advanced protections like endpoint security, I don't really like you putting me into some square of caring only about E2EE. All I can say to you is, first things first. [1] https://github.com/maqp/tfc https://github.com/maqp/tfc