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Not the one you responded to but: I don't know enough about airplanes to say if the MAX could have certified as it's own type. I'd like to hope it could becaus
by Swenrekcah 6y ago
Not the one you responded to but:
I don't know enough about airplanes to say if the MAX could have certified as it's own type. I'd like to hope it could because if not then that would show a very sorry state of affairs indeed.
But the big issue with the MAX is not that it handles differently, it is that Boeing lied to everyone about that fact.
Then they made another semi-unforgivable error by masking the handling with software, ok, but didn't even take the most basic steps available to ensure some redundancy in that software.
It is just so very very bad engineering and mindset that it's hard to describe.
Would I fly on a MAX if and when they get clearance again?
Maybe after it's been flying for a year or so, and depending on what some trusted people and institutions say about it.
- throwaway0a5e 6y ago>But the big issue with the MAX is not that it handles differently, it is that Boeing lied to everyone about that fact. Then they made another semi-unforgivable error by masking the handling with software, ok, but didn't even take the most basic steps available to ensure some redundancy in that software. Which is exactly what I'm saying and the opposite of what the author and DTAL are saying. >It is just so very very bad engineering and mindset that it's hard to describe. I don't think it's even a mindset. It's that sort of "nobody is responsible for a large enough part of the system to be able to stop things and force things to be done right" situation that a lot of big-cos get into that results in them crapping out half baked products. >Would I fly on a MAX if and when they get clearance again? Maybe after it's been flying for a year or so, and depending on what some trusted people and institutions say about it. For me the decision would hinge on what training the pilots get.
- Swenrekcah 6y ago>I don't think it's even a mindset. It's that sort of "nobody is responsible for a large enough part of the system to be able to stop things and force things to be done right" situation that a lot of big-cos get into that results in them crapping out half baked products. I agree that plays a part. But the people in charge of the flight computer software should know better than to have no redundancy. And the executives definately are able to stop things and force them to be done right, and instill in their employees a mentality of safety-first. But their bonuses might have suffered, so...