3 ms·
You're right, my phrasing was not accurate in my initial post. Let me rephrase: You cannot identify/designate the experience of seeing "red" any more precisely
by geofft 6y ago
You're right, my phrasing was not accurate in my initial post. Let me rephrase:
You cannot identify/designate the experience of seeing "red" any more precisely than "that experience one has on seeing 700nm-wavelength light," just like you cannot identify the experience of seeing "three" any more than "that experience one has on seeing a thing and another thing and another thing."
It's true that you do not need the actual perception in order to have the experience, in either case. But do you believe there is a hard problem of the experience of three? Do you ask whether the exact symphony that plays in your brain plays in mine when we look at the same three objects?
(Maybe yes, and I'm misunderstanding what you think the hard problem is?)
- goatlover 6y ago> But do you believe there is a hard problem of the experience of three? I think there seems to be a hard problem of any experience, be it red, three, pain, etc, because nobody has come up with a convincing way of how to reduce that to the physical. > Do you ask whether the exact symphony that plays in your brain plays in mine when we look at the same three objects? I doubt it does as individual brains differ, although there are likely similar patterns of neurons firing. This is why it's hard to reduce experience to brain activity. > Maybe yes, and I'm misunderstanding what you think the hard problem is? Making consciousness compatible with physicalism.