4 ms·
This is not a use case anyone serious cares about. Data retention for ciphertext where the keys, stored and distributed elsewhere, have been deleted/zeroized,
by sneak 6y ago
This is not a use case anyone serious cares about.
Data retention for ciphertext where the keys, stored and distributed elsewhere, have been deleted/zeroized, is a complete non-issue.
- ahnick 6y agoWhy is that? I think it is entirely possible that in the future, encryption techniques used today will become compromised as both computing power improves and/or flaws are discovered. If someone is holding ciphertext encrypted with a compromised algorithm, then it could be decrypted. Basically, how do you know what we are encrypting today, won't be able to have the encryption broken 30 or 50 years from now?
- folmar 6y agoYou don't, but offline attacks tend to be relatively hard. 3DES is 25 years old now and not an easy target for a casual attacker.