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We do not know that all plants and animals experience sensations subjectively. We know that they respond to stimuli; we do not know that they experience qualia.

We do not know that all plants and animals experience sensations subjectively. We know that they respond to stimuli; we do not know that they experience qualia. This path can lead to solipsism, but there are many exit points between "I am the only conscious being" and "all living things are conscious."

lmm 6y ago
We don't know that anything experiences qualia, ourselves included, because the concept hasn't been rigorously defined - perhaps because it's not actually a valid concept at all.
- GeneralMayhem 6y ago
  I think you're going to find it a very hard sell to convince me that I don't experience qualia. I don't know what it's like to feel pain? I don't experience sight, or sound, or abstract thoughts and beliefs, as subjective experiences? The problem with qualia, subjective consciousness, and all their near-synonyms is that they're almost impossible to define non-self-referentially. That doesn't mean they don't exist, though - and all human experience is indication that they do.
  - lmm 6y ago
    > I think you're going to find it a very hard sell to convince me that I don't experience qualia. I don't know what it's like to feel pain? I don't experience sight, or sound, or abstract thoughts and beliefs, as subjective experiences? Well, what would you expect to be different if you weren't? Presumably you'd still behave the same way that you do now (because by definition qualia aren't the externally observable parts of your experience), so none of the experiences that affect your decision-making process can be part of them - so wouldn't existing without qualia feel exactly the same as existing with qualia? In which case, why are you sure that you're not already doing it? What if you're not actually conscious, you just think you are?
    - GeneralMayhem 6y ago
      What you've described is a p-zombie. Living without qualia would (if you buy that theory; there are various levels of rebuttal) look exactly the same from the outside. Behavior and decisions would be the same, and I'd pass any possible test that I'm a real person (at least with current neuroscience). But that only works for an outside observer. I can't be tricked into thinking I'm conscious, because it's recursive: who, then, is getting tricked? I know that I'm conscious because I'm the one experiencing things. You know that you're conscious for the same reason. Neither of us has a good way of being sure that the other one - or anyone else - is, at least not without some deeper philosophical reasoning.
      - lmm 6y ago
        > But that only works for an outside observer. I can't be tricked into thinking I'm conscious, because it's recursive: who, then, is getting tricked? I know that I'm conscious because I'm the one experiencing things. You know that you're conscious for the same reason. Again, seriously, how can I tell? There are people who can't visualise things in their head, and largely don't realise there's anything strange about them. I can certainly introspect my thoughts, but I can talk about the results of that, so presumably a p-zombie is also able to do that. I don't think there's any part of my experience that doesn't affect my actions, so I don't think this notion of qualia is valid.

lmm 6y ago

We don't know that anything experiences qualia, ourselves included, because the concept hasn't been rigorously defined - perhaps because it's not actually a valid concept at all.

GeneralMayhem 6y ago
I think you're going to find it a very hard sell to convince me that I don't experience qualia. I don't know what it's like to feel pain? I don't experience sight, or sound, or abstract thoughts and beliefs, as subjective experiences? The problem with qualia, subjective consciousness, and all their near-synonyms is that they're almost impossible to define non-self-referentially. That doesn't mean they don't exist, though - and all human experience is indication that they do.
- lmm 6y ago
  > I think you're going to find it a very hard sell to convince me that I don't experience qualia. I don't know what it's like to feel pain? I don't experience sight, or sound, or abstract thoughts and beliefs, as subjective experiences? Well, what would you expect to be different if you weren't? Presumably you'd still behave the same way that you do now (because by definition qualia aren't the externally observable parts of your experience), so none of the experiences that affect your decision-making process can be part of them - so wouldn't existing without qualia feel exactly the same as existing with qualia? In which case, why are you sure that you're not already doing it? What if you're not actually conscious, you just think you are?
  - GeneralMayhem 6y ago
    What you've described is a p-zombie. Living without qualia would (if you buy that theory; there are various levels of rebuttal) look exactly the same from the outside. Behavior and decisions would be the same, and I'd pass any possible test that I'm a real person (at least with current neuroscience). But that only works for an outside observer. I can't be tricked into thinking I'm conscious, because it's recursive: who, then, is getting tricked? I know that I'm conscious because I'm the one experiencing things. You know that you're conscious for the same reason. Neither of us has a good way of being sure that the other one - or anyone else - is, at least not without some deeper philosophical reasoning.
    - lmm 6y ago
      > But that only works for an outside observer. I can't be tricked into thinking I'm conscious, because it's recursive: who, then, is getting tricked? I know that I'm conscious because I'm the one experiencing things. You know that you're conscious for the same reason. Again, seriously, how can I tell? There are people who can't visualise things in their head, and largely don't realise there's anything strange about them. I can certainly introspect my thoughts, but I can talk about the results of that, so presumably a p-zombie is also able to do that. I don't think there's any part of my experience that doesn't affect my actions, so I don't think this notion of qualia is valid.