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One very important thing most people forget: If you can verify that your vote was correctly counted, your vote can't be kept secret, and intimidation and vote
by BurningFrog 6y ago
One very important thing most people forget:
If you can verify that your vote was correctly counted, your vote can't be kept secret, and intimidation and vote buying becomes impossible to stop.
> Whereas with paper I can't count the votes myself, I have to trust the authorities who did that.
The way it works in my home country is that the paper ballots are handled in an inspectable way and anyone can observe the counting process. You can't check your vote, but you can control all the votes.
- beaner 6y ago> If you can verify that your vote was correctly counted, your vote can't be kept secret This is false. Votes (transactions) in Bitcoin are pseudonymous, meaning everyone can see what votes were placed, but nobody knows who was responsible for the specific votes. Only the owner knows, unless they choose to reveal to others.
- ses1984 6y agoDid you stop reading right at the end of the part you quoted?
- beaner 6y agoYes, not sure how it's related.
- milkshakes 6y agoif you can verify your vote after it has been counted, you can be induced by a third party to vote for a specific candidate
- beaner 6y agoYeah, I think it wasn't clear to me as being the point said in the line in question. Guess I can see it now.
- revnode 6y agoThe overwhelming majority of the population doesn't have the capacity to understand what you wrote or why that is true. Even the majority of those who understand why it may be true, cannot say for certain that it is true without inspecting the codebase and its operation. That's a major problem.
- beaner 6y agoI mean, you could say the same thing about current electronic voting or even about how aggregate paper voting is counted behind the scenes. Those things involve some level of trust. I don’t think what I wrote is that difficult to understand. I think you’re underestimating people when you say “the overwhelming majority of the people do not have the capacity to understand what you said.” Really? Not even the capacity to understand? In any case, the trust involved for a blockchain-based voting system with pseudonymity is much less than the other systems, because they can be 3rd-party audited, or even open source. And that auditing only needs to happen once rather than for each local vote collection method. Explaining to the end-user is just a matter of communication. That’s not a “major problem.” People don't need to know how a blockchain works just like they don't need to know how UPS works. They just need to know that they're able to place a vote anonymously and verify themselves later if they want to.
- atoav 6y agoIn most democratic nations everybody can volunteer to be present at counting. This is in itself a control mechanism, as it would be highly unlikely that meaningful voting fraud would be carried out under the eyes of the observers from multiple parties without anyone making a ruckus. This is an effective mechanism which apparently convinces enough people that the votes are legitimate. With blockchain you would have to: - have them understand blockchain algorithms - have them understand computers (so they understand why blockchain might be safe here) - have them understand networking technologies - convince them all of that (and no more/less) is on the actual machines on voting day, for every vote Have you ever tried explaining what an URL is to your parents? Or how passwords are stored? I am positively convinced that not an insignificant amount of the electorate would just say "there was some hack" when things didn't go their way. And they don't even need to show you proof, because you won't be able to proof the opposite because they won't understand it. Ultimately to me the benefits of a blockchain system don't really show. It is far to complicated and has too many moving parts.
- sgc 6y agoOr if they are forced to reveal it under duress, or they choose to reveal it to get paid for the result, etc.
- BurningFrog 6y ago> Only the owner knows, unless they choose to reveal to others. Which means the owner can be forced to reveal their vote to a spouse/boss/warlord. I could have been clearer that that is what I meant.
- beaner 6y agoYes, that makes more sense and I think that's a valid point, thanks. To be fair I thought you meant that it couldn't be kept secret from a global view - that anyone who wanted could look at the blockchain and attach votes to identities.
- davisr 6y agoI'd never want electronic voting either, but this myth needs to die. Intimidation can happen with absentee voting too, so it's not a valid concern.
- cochne 6y agoDoes it apply at the same level? I could see some ransomware that says if your vote doesn’t appear on the blockchain you are not getting your files back. Meanwhile to achieve intimidation with absentee voting, wouldn’t you have to check the physical ballot in person?
- hannasanarion 6y agoBut with absentee voting, the votes are still counted by hand. That's the part that has to be the most secure. With any paper voting system, votes can be impacted by some criminal scheme, yes, but only one at a time and with great individual effort. You have to blackmail a LOT of people to swing an election. Whereas with an electronic election, one attacker can change millions of votes with a single bit of malware code, with nobody the wiser.
- the_snooze 6y ago>But with absentee voting, the votes are still counted by hand. The verification is manual, but the counting probably isn't. At least in California, absentee (mail) ballots are exactly the same ones you get at the polling place. You put them in an unmarked envelope, which you place inside another envelope with your information and signature. The counting center verifies the information on the outer envelope and ensures you didn't already vote elsewhere in-person. If it's good, then the inner (unmarked) envelope is taken out and a machine processes the ballot as if you were in the physical precinct.
- hannasanarion 6y agoNonetheless, there is a physical paper record of every vote that can be counted by hand, the machine is just for a quick estimate of the count. There are only 2 points of trust in a mail election: the vote itself which could be compromised by blackmail or whatever (low risk because only one vote can be influenced at a time), and the scantron machine (low risk because the ballots can still be counted by hand to verify). But if your vote is just a byte getting added to a database on a server from your personal computer over the internet, there are a hundred high-risk trust points. You have to trust the user, but also the website, the browser, the operating system, the network, the hardware, the server, the software running on the server and everybody who has ever worked on it, the counting software, the people operating the counting software, and a compromise at any single one of these points could change millions of votes without any possibility of detection. In other words, in a scantron election, the legal vote is the paper, the electronics are just convenience. In an internet election, the legal vote is the ephemeral machine-generated bits on a wire, and that's where the problem comes from.
- eloff 6y agoYou can make the vote anonymous with electronic voting, in a way only you can verify if you wanted. There are existing voting systems with that property.
- pwg 6y ago> in a way only you can verify if you wanted But, if "you" can verify it, then "you" can also be coerced into revealing that verification in order to avoid physical punishment (guy with big wrench who /requested/ you vote for A lest he begin breaking knee caps mentioned in a sibling post).
- eloff 6y agoThere are ways to provide verifiability without that vulnerability. But since there's no way to prevent the wrench guy standing over your shoulder, I think you could only really solve that problem if you vote in person. If you're doing that I still think blockchain voting is great, but then you should also print out a paper trail and tally that separately. Then you have two overlapping systems with different trust properties and both must be in agreement for the election result to be valid.
- aksss 6y agoThere’s so much to be said for voting in person, the reason you stated chief amongst them. However, attending to the polling place on Election Day is very healthy for a community, IME. Also, there’s something virtuous in expecting people to get their shit together enough to walk in on Election Day, so long as early voting is there to accommodate those who cannot make it that day. The rush to vote by mail (with risk of ballot harvesting, which I saw in my own city (a Republican incidentally) and online voting (with associated risks) seems foolish to me. The secret ballot, completed by oneself in guaranteed isolation, is the pillar of my confidence in our system. Pandemic be damned - it’s not a severe enough crisis (by the number of deaths) to warrant overhauling the system the night before. Feels very much like a useful opportunity to advance an erosion of faith in the electoral system. If I were Russia or China, I would be looking on at the discord with glee right now.