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You are not the only one. However I don't think security is even a relevant concern, because there is one much more fundamental flaw in all electronic voting sy
by atoav 6y ago
You are not the only one. However I don't think security is even a relevant concern, because there is one much more fundamental flaw in all electronic voting systems:
The goal of voting is to produce agreeable consent — so it doesn't really matter how you organise voting, as long as everybody afterwards can agree who won, who lost and by how much.
So phrased differently, one of the most important properties of any voting systems is that people afterwards can't just call the result into question. This can only be true if most people voting understand the mechanism, can verify it themselves and manipulation on big scales is hard.
This is why I think any electronic voting system is problematic. Even a total expert would have a hard time proving that one machine worked as it should on election day. If you then have some Autocrat who raises doubt about the election result whom do you trust? That expert who tells you that manipulation was mathematically impossible or that autocrat whose party you vote?
- chrismeller 6y agoAnd don't forget that the US operates on the Electoral College, which a shocking number of people don't even understand. Since each state has different rules about their EC delegates, popular vote does not necessarily equal winner... Now try telling that to people when there's a big screen with "official" numbers that were all provided electronically an hour after polls closed...
- enaaem 6y agoTaiwan has the best way of counting votes. Ballot is hold in the air, the name is called out and someone in the back keeps the score. Everyone can see what is going on. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqKt-lPfJuw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqKt-lPfJuw
- Beldin 6y agoThat is a great way to elect the one who buys the most votes. If you want to avoid such shenanigans, you'll need to enforce voter privacy.
- jadyoyster 6y agoThe vote is private but the counting is public.
- Beldin 6y agoI stand corrected.
- Ericson2314 6y agoTo be clear, they are calling out the number that indexes the papers, not a name of a person or a name of a candidate. 一號, 二號, 三號…. 正 is the tally mark https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E6%AD%A3 https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E6%AD%A3 I have like a 1-2 year old's level of Mandarin at this point, sigh, but I don't think there is a detail I'm missing once the process gets going. This is a good, accessible voting system.
- dnpp123 6y agoI think that system is pretty similar everywhere, probably only in the US you have some weird mechanical machine to cast your vote.
- Tagbert 6y agoI’m in the US and the weird mechanical machine that casts my vote is a black pen filling in a circle. That can be read quickly by a simple electronic machine or more slowly by humans if there is a question. It’s low tech and hard to influence on a non-trivial scale. It is true that some places use much more complex systems and I don’t really understand the interest in those. It definitely don’t see any benefit to fully electronic voting, block-chain or otherwise. Voting doesn’t have to be efficient. It needs to be reliable, understandable, and believable.
- the_snooze 6y agoThere are practical limitations that prevent us from doing that in the US. Specifically, our ballots tend to be long and complicated. A California ballot on a presidential year can have dozens of contests, from president to dog catcher to referenda. Reading out all ballots would be very time-consuming and likely very error-prone as poll workers are pretty tired by the end of the night. This is why we have scanners to speed up counting paper ballots. And paper ballots are retained for targeted manual counts if there's a need for auditing or recounts.
- eloff 6y agoWouldn't a blockchain voting system help here, if everyone can examine the time, place, and votes in the history, and see that all the block hashes match what's expected? That gives much stronger guarantees than paper, and while the average Joe can't verify it himself, there would be three million programmers in the US alone who easily could. Whereas with paper I can't count the votes myself, I have to trust the authorities who did that.
- Ericson2314 6y agoThe average Joe doesn't want the nerds to pick the president. Also, don't forget it's a secret ballot, and we do not have any good database of people with public keys in this country. What the hell am I supposed to make of a ledger with 100s of million anonymous public keys? Surely I cannot claim that relates 1-1 with the choices of real people.
- dnpp123 6y agoI'm definitely opposed to 'electronic' voting, but the problem you are describing is easily solvable with asymmetric cryptography. You'd have your private key on your 'voting card' (unsure how you call it in the US) with some pw and the machine would just scan it, ask your password. You just need the proof that someone having a private key associated with a public key on a public record has signed, not necessarily know to which public key it is associated. But there would be so much problems with such a system that I would'nt even know where to start..
- Ericson2314 6y agoRight. It's not that anonymity is impossible, but that anonymity is one requirement we can remove and make the problem tractable again. There may be other such "straws that broke the camels back", but IMO anonymity is one property that makes a cryptosystem far less intuitive even to me. It's the bridge I never advocate crossing unless people with more security knowledge than me go to great lengths to demonstrate otherwise.
- egypturnash 6y ago
- cheph 6y ago> So phrased differently, one of the most important properties of any voting systems is that people afterwards can't just call the result into question. This is a solved problem with in person voting, I would say that is one thing where South Africa has gotten it down quite well. There is voter ID at the polls with voter registers to ensure only citizens can vote and nobody can vote twice, vote boxes are sealed and only unsealed with observers present from all parties and international observers, there is also observers at the polling stations from all parties, overall there is nothing to dispute and even in one of the most corrupt countries in the world election results are not disputed because everybody knows it would be absurd to dispute.
- atoav 6y agoWhich is precisely the strength of such a system. People often complain about voting being slow — but being slow is a feature not a bug in this case. Better slow and right than fast and wrong.
- cheph 6y agoDefinitely, I would have it 10 times slower to increase integrity. I think people that have not lived under despotic regimes maybe don't understand the potential downsides of a loss in election integrity.
- cheerlessbog 6y agoThis is part of the reason we still use plurality voting.
- achow 6y agoI guess both can be achieved - electronic voting along with a mechanism of having a verifiable 'agreeable consent'. How electronic voting machines have improved India’s democracy https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/06/how-electronic-voting-machines-have-improved-indias-democracy/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/06/how-elect... Excerpt: ..the study provides strong evidence that the introduction of EVMs led to (i) a significant decline in electoral fraud, (ii) strengthening the weaker and vulnerable sections of the society, and (iii) a more competitive electoral process. Under the paper ballot system, polling booths would often be captured and ballot boxes would be stuffed, resulting in an unusually high voter turnout. EVMs helped tackle this risk by incorporating an important feature—registering only five votes per minute. Committing electoral fraud would require capturing polling booths for longer periods. The success of the EVMs in India warranted a comprehensive audit mechanism to verify the votes cast. In 2013, the Election Commission of India formally incorporated Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) machines in the electoral systems. The VVPAT—leaving behind a paper trail of the vote cast—acts as an additional layer of verifiability and assurance in the electoral process. A paper record ensures that the vote has indeed gone to the intended candidate and is recorded as such.
- jlokier 6y ago+1 for the wonderfully succinct "agreeable consent".