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What troubles me with this is that at some point in the system there will need to be a mapping "real identity" -> "ID of voter in the blockchain". What happens
by Galanwe 6y ago
What troubles me with this is that at some point in the system there will need to be a mapping "real identity" -> "ID of voter in the blockchain".
What happens the day this mapping leaks?
- foepys 6y agoEven if that's solved: what happens when voters lose they key? Or worse: get it stolen from them.
- soulofmischief 6y agoIdeally you should be able to produce a unique hash each time you vote, derived from your master key. The server doesn't need to know your private key. This is how crypto works now, generating unique and theoretically unlinkable wallet addresses from a secret key.
- sebmellen 6y agoIn theory, this on-chain voter ID would never have to be "mapped" directly to a voter. Rather, IDs are simply private-public keypair accounts, and all that's provisioned by the holders of the election is the right to vote with one account. Then, the vote is cast by redeeming this right to vote token, without the voting account ever being linked to a "real identity". Of course, there are problems here too. Mainly with UX, and then at a low level the hardware used (the general public is very easy to hack if you have nation-state power).
- marzell 6y agoHow does this compare with Estonia and their use of public ID numbers? I just know they don't consider their ID numbers secret the way SSNs are in the US, yet they use them for everything. How do they prevent fraud and ID theft?
- sebmellen 6y agoIn Estonia, a user has a digital ID card, which contains a secure chip. Neither they or their computers can ever read the private keys contained in this chip. The card is minted like a passport or driver's license, so it's basically impossible to get a card for someone you aren't. The voting system works similarly to this "right to vote" token model in the backend, from what I know of it. The only difference is that the ID card is where the sensitive data is statically encoded (not on a theoretically hackable computer). They did have some cryptography problems a while back though. The government says it was not too big of a deal because they caught the bug, and would never have held an election with the bug still present. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/estonia-advanced-digital-society-here-s-how-that-helped-it-during-covid-19/ https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/estonia-advanced-digi... https://www.reuters.com/article/estonia-gemalto/estonia-sues-gemalto-for-152-mln-euros-over-id-card-flaws-idUSL8N1WD5JZ https://www.reuters.com/article/estonia-gemalto/estonia-sues...
- tpetry 6y agoMany countries have id numbers which are not a secret. In those countries you simply can‘t do anything with the number. Creating a bank account by mail with a ssn? Impossible you have to be at the department and show your passport. You cant be at a department? The postal service in germany can verify your identity if you are there, or there are some online webcam solutions where you have to show your passport in the webcam, rotate it by instructions etc.
- Galanwe 6y agoHmm, not sure that would work though. What happens when an ID is stolen? If there is nothing mapping "John Smith" to "ID #12345", then you have no way to revoke IDs because you cannot know if the person claiming the ID is the true owner. Wouldn't that mean stealing IDs will be virtually un punishable, and reselling them very lucrative?
- xorcist 6y agoYou don't want to issue new tokens either, because you can't know for sure that the token was really stolen. In which it won't take many users who demonstratably can't vote because someone stolen their token for someone to question the outcome. The only point of democratic elections is the legitimacy of the result.
- jlokier 6y agoWhen a large-scale vote is really tight, there will be people questioning its legitimacy anyway, no matter if it's technically correct. When a vote outcome is clearly in favour of one direction, people don't tend to argue about the legitimacy of it, provided the process was reasonable enough. In that case, the numbers might be argued, but not the outcome unless there is a stronger belief in vote-rigging or voter-suppression. In the UK, it's quite easy for a small number of individuals to cheat in elections and double-vote, due to how voting wards are assigned when people move home, or have multiple places they live. Or to cheat by pretending to be someone else. But we assume cheating isn't widespread enough to matter in the grand scheme of things (even if the occasional "wrong" MP did get in on a knife edge), and consider ease of voter participation to be a sounder basis of governance, compared with draconian identity-tracking schemes that deter representation because of all the actual people who for one reason or another would not participate.
- Galanwe 6y agoWhile I agree with you on the big picture, at the individual level, it's becomes really hard to justify. Imagine the following conversation: - "officier, my wallet just got robbed, I had my voting digital card in it, what can I do?" - "nothing, anyway a single vote does not matter in the overall election"