4 ms·

I don't know if the person that wrote the parent comment has read "On Liberty" - a chapter on "Liberty of Thought and Discussion" makes the point of unfettered

I don't know if the person that wrote the parent comment has read "On Liberty" - a chapter on "Liberty of Thought and Discussion" makes the point of unfettered freedom of speech and goes into depth into it (thus somehow contradicting himself on the harm principle, but solving the contradiction by elevating the liberty of opinion though and expression). Also, regarding the harm principle (or self-harm), Stuart Mill had to deal with his own contradictions to defend the principle of right to inflict self-harm and at the same time defend his position against slavery. What I want to mean, but I can't devote to much time to, is that 'freedom' is a topic that is really difficult, full of struggles, and also, that it has been known to be difficult to tackle since antiquity and has produced an enormous corpus of interesting literature.

FeepingCreature 6y ago
I haven't, but I'm not afraid to put forth a strong position. That way if I'm wrong, I will find out quickly. :) That said, it just seemed to me that the article fell into a typical mistake early on, of confusing the map and the territory- fear and harm- and from there weakening its own position by requiring the addition of special case rules and self-contradiction: fear of facepunching, but not fear of the gay - what makes one valid and the other invalid? And if it's real plausibility, why not just direct the right at the real thing that makes it plausible, and thus turn the fear into a justified expectation open to empirical argumentation? It seemed like the argument would vanish down a rabbit hole for little benefit.
- claudiawerner 6y ago
  >weakening its own position by requiring the addition of special case rules and self-contradiction: fear of facepunching, but not fear of the gay - what makes one valid and the other invalid? You're asking this question with some knowledge that there is some difference in the minds of people between the two matters. Therefore, we can draw a difference, we just may not have a philosophical grounding to express the difference rigorously. I can see how that's a problem, but it does not stop consideration of the principles. Even if the difference is arbitrary, we can't escape arbitrary reasoning in our moral and legal systems. The difference from my perspective is that I'd be more inclined to protest a law criminalizing gay people for (using your example) having sex in private than I would be someone arguing in a public forum that Jews should be punched in the face. Is my decision arbitrary? Maybe. Does it rely on a judiciary and legislature that agrees with my ad-hoc principle in order not to run away with it? Yes. That's not necessarily a problem. It's not much to ask people to think beyond pure abstraction of high-minded principles. You (or some other citizen) may disagree with me and come to the opposite conclusion I have, or not. That's fine. I'll vote for my principle, and you can vote for yours.
  - FeepingCreature 6y ago
    I don't believe there is a difference in the minds of people between the two matters! Or rather, people may hold a different opinion on the validity of the fear, but one fear is the same as another fear. I do believe there is a difference in the relation of their fear to reality, which is why I think policy should just attach to reality to begin with. I don't think the difference is arbitrary - I think there is a relative and vital material difference, it just cannot be reduced to a quality of the fear in itself.
    - claudiawerner 6y ago
      >I don't believe there is a difference in the minds of people between the two matters! Correct me if I'm misunderstanding you: do you think that if you were to take a representative sample of the population of a Western European country or the US, they'd be just as opposed to regulating fear caused by gay people having sex in private and fear caused by someone coming up to a Jewish person and saying that all Jews should be kicked in the face? >but one fear is the same as another fear. From what perspective? If it's a subjective perspective, we'd have to turn to psychological studies. If it's an objective perspective, there's no way of knowing that at all, since fear is inherently subjective. >I think there is a relative and vital material difference, it just cannot be reduced to a quality of the fear in itself. I agree, but this is precisely the problem with the harm principle. You can overload 'harm' with (what I consider to be) a silly harm, such as causing fear of the 'gay agenda' because gay people have sex in private, and a more serious harm, causing fear of being punched in the face. My point is only this: the idea that only contact, physical harms are in the domain of society's lawmakers is highly suspect. If lawmakers are granted the power to regulate mental harms (and in some cases they already are in most countries including the U.S.), we can have a discussion (or at least a preference, if not all parties can come to a rational well-grounded principle) on which of those harms can be regulated - and in my view, in most Western societies, the people would be much more likely to say that the Jewish face punching situation is much more serious or deserving of regulation than the gay agenda situation.
      - FeepingCreature 6y ago

FeepingCreature 6y ago

I haven't, but I'm not afraid to put forth a strong position. That way if I'm wrong, I will find out quickly. :) That said, it just seemed to me that the article fell into a typical mistake early on, of confusing the map and the territory- fear and harm- and from there weakening its own position by requiring the addition of special case rules and self-contradiction: fear of facepunching, but not fear of the gay - what makes one valid and the other invalid? And if it's real plausibility, why not just direct the right at the real thing that makes it plausible, and thus turn the fear into a justified expectation open to empirical argumentation? It seemed like the argument would vanish down a rabbit hole for little benefit.

claudiawerner 6y ago
>weakening its own position by requiring the addition of special case rules and self-contradiction: fear of facepunching, but not fear of the gay - what makes one valid and the other invalid? You're asking this question with some knowledge that there is some difference in the minds of people between the two matters. Therefore, we can draw a difference, we just may not have a philosophical grounding to express the difference rigorously. I can see how that's a problem, but it does not stop consideration of the principles. Even if the difference is arbitrary, we can't escape arbitrary reasoning in our moral and legal systems. The difference from my perspective is that I'd be more inclined to protest a law criminalizing gay people for (using your example) having sex in private than I would be someone arguing in a public forum that Jews should be punched in the face. Is my decision arbitrary? Maybe. Does it rely on a judiciary and legislature that agrees with my ad-hoc principle in order not to run away with it? Yes. That's not necessarily a problem. It's not much to ask people to think beyond pure abstraction of high-minded principles. You (or some other citizen) may disagree with me and come to the opposite conclusion I have, or not. That's fine. I'll vote for my principle, and you can vote for yours.
- FeepingCreature 6y ago
  I don't believe there is a difference in the minds of people between the two matters! Or rather, people may hold a different opinion on the validity of the fear, but one fear is the same as another fear. I do believe there is a difference in the relation of their fear to reality, which is why I think policy should just attach to reality to begin with. I don't think the difference is arbitrary - I think there is a relative and vital material difference, it just cannot be reduced to a quality of the fear in itself.
  - claudiawerner 6y ago
    >I don't believe there is a difference in the minds of people between the two matters! Correct me if I'm misunderstanding you: do you think that if you were to take a representative sample of the population of a Western European country or the US, they'd be just as opposed to regulating fear caused by gay people having sex in private and fear caused by someone coming up to a Jewish person and saying that all Jews should be kicked in the face? >but one fear is the same as another fear. From what perspective? If it's a subjective perspective, we'd have to turn to psychological studies. If it's an objective perspective, there's no way of knowing that at all, since fear is inherently subjective. >I think there is a relative and vital material difference, it just cannot be reduced to a quality of the fear in itself. I agree, but this is precisely the problem with the harm principle. You can overload 'harm' with (what I consider to be) a silly harm, such as causing fear of the 'gay agenda' because gay people have sex in private, and a more serious harm, causing fear of being punched in the face. My point is only this: the idea that only contact, physical harms are in the domain of society's lawmakers is highly suspect. If lawmakers are granted the power to regulate mental harms (and in some cases they already are in most countries including the U.S.), we can have a discussion (or at least a preference, if not all parties can come to a rational well-grounded principle) on which of those harms can be regulated - and in my view, in most Western societies, the people would be much more likely to say that the Jewish face punching situation is much more serious or deserving of regulation than the gay agenda situation.
    - FeepingCreature 6y ago