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I think Drew responded to that. I thought this was a key quote: > Off the bat, let me explain that I expect a tool which claims to be secure to actually be sec
by ColanR 6y ago
I think Drew responded to that. I thought this was a key quote:
> Off the bat, let me explain that I expect a tool which claims to be secure to actually be secure. I don’t view “but that makes it harder for the average person” as an acceptable excuse. If Edward Snowden and Bruce Schneier are going to spout the virtues of the app, I expect it to actually be secure when it matters - when vulnerable people using it to encrypt sensitive communications are targeted by smart and powerful adversaries....it’s your responsibility to clearly explain the drawbacks and advantages of the tradeoffs you make. If you make broad and inaccurate statements about your communications product being “secure”, then when the political prisoners who believed you are being tortured and hanged, it’s on you.
- tptacek 6y agoWhich is pretty rich, because in the post where that quote originally appeared, the author recommended as an alternative to Signal a tool that wasn't even end-to-end encrypted by default.
- Shared404 6y agoA) I see that nowhere in this post, so the author must have retracted it when he found that out. B) Matrix has always been very easy to set up E2E C) Matrix is now E2E by default, at least with the client non-technical users will be using. I think it is for the other clients as well, but I do not know for sure.
- tptacek 6y agoYes, the author ghost-edited it out of his post, months later. You can see the original on Archive.org. Matrix was years from being E2E by default when this post, and that recommendation, was written.
- Shared404 6y ago> Yes, the author ghost-edited it out of his post, months later. It was still removed. Would it have been better to leave a note saying it had been? Yes. Nobody is perfect however. > Matrix was years from being E2E by default when this post, and that recommendation, was written. See point B from my other comment. Edit: Add Would ... however.
- tptacek 6y agoI'm not sure how point B is relevant. Obviously, every message board argument about bad UX is going to feature someone saying that the UX is just fine. Telling vulnerable users to adopt a tool that is default plaintext is malpractice.
- Shared404 6y agoWhenever I moved my friends onto Matrix, all I had to do was hit the "Encrypt room" button for each of our rooms. They did not have to do anything else. Is this ideal? No. Is it E2E for their other rooms? No. Is it E2E for any usage of matrix they were going to be doing? Yes. I also told them to be sure to hit that button if they did start any other rooms. None of them ever did, but they knew that they should if they cared about being secure. Riot.im also did a good job of letting you know that it was unencrypted unless you hit that button. Edit: What it boils down to, is that Matrix has been easy to set up E2E for as long as I can remember. It is also trivial to create a matrix account with no tie to your IRL self.
- ColanR 6y ago> in the post where that quote originally appeared, the author recommended as an alternative to Signal a tool that wasn't even end-to-end encrypted by default You seem really hung up on that. A transient recommendation has very little to do with stated expectation that "a tool which claims to be secure [should] actually be secure".
- tptacek 6y agoYes, I take secure messenger recommendations seriously; bad ones get people hurt. Tfiles have been passed around about the harm that has come to people using two other then-popular "secure" messengers. (Matrix is very cool and I think it has a bright future as an IRC replacement and ultimately, perhaps, a Slack competitor --- something that provides opsec suitable for a commercial setting. I always come across as a Matrix hater in these threads, and I do not hate Matrix, and wish the project well.)